body in the universe, nor appeal to God's cmnipotency, to find a vacuum, the motion of bodies that are in our view and neighborhood feems to me plainly to evince it. For I defire any one fo to divide a folid body, of any dimension he pleases, as to make it poffible for the folid parts to move up and down freely every way within the bounds of that fuperficies, if there be not left in it a void fpace, as big as the leaft part into which he ha, divided the faid folid body. And if where the least particle of the body divided is as big as a mustard-feed, a void space equal to the bulk of a muftard-feed be requifite to make room for the free motion of the parts of the divided body within the bounds of its fuperficies, where the particles of matter are 100,000,000 lefs than a mustard-feed, there must also be a space void of folid matter as big as 100,000,000 part of a muftard-feed; for if it hold in one, it will hold in the other, and fo on in infinitum. And let this void fpace be as little as it will, it deftroys the hypothefis of plenitude. For if there be a space void of body equal to the finalleft feparate particle of matter now exifting in nature, it is fill space without body; and makes as great a difference between space andbody, as if it were a great opening, a distance as wide as any in nature. And therefore, if we fuppofe not the void fpace neceffary to notion, equal to the leaft parcel of the divided folid matter, but to 1-10th, or 1000th of it; the fame confequence will always follow of fpace without matter.

24. The Ideas of Space and Body diftinct. BUT the question being here, Whether the idea of space or extenfion be the fame with the idea of body, it is not neceflary to prove the real existence of a vacuum, but the idea of it; which it is plain men have, when they in"quire and difpute, whether there be a vacuum or no. For if they had not the idea of fpace without body, they could not make a question about its exiftence : and if their idea of body did not include in it fomething more than the bare idea of space, they could have no doubt about the plenitude of the world; and it

would be as abfurd to demand, whether there were fpace without body, as whether there were space without space, or body without body, fince these were but different names of the fame idea.

§ 25. Extenfion being infeparable from body, proves it not the fame.

IT is true, the idea of extenfion joins itself fo infeparably with all vifible and moft tangible qualities, that it suffers us to fee no one, or feel very few external objects, without taking in impreffions of extenfion too. This readiness of extenfion to make itself be taken notice of fo conftantly with other ideas, has been the occafion, I guefs, that fome have made the whole effence of body to confift in extenfion; which is not much to be wondered at, fince fome have had their minds, by their eyes and touch (the busiest of all our fenses) fo filled with the idea of extenfion, and as it were wholly poffeffed with it, that they allowed no existence to any thing that had not extenfion. I fhall not now argue with those men, who take the measure and poffibility of all being, only from their narrow and grofs imaginations but having here to do only with thofe who conclude the effence of body to be extenfion, because they fay they cannot imagine any fenfible quality of any body without extenfion; I fhall defire them to confider, that had they reflected on their ideas of tastes and smells, as much as on thofe of fight and touch: nay, had they examined their ideas of hunger and thirst, and several other pains, they would have found that they included in them no idea of extenfion at all ; which is but an affection of body, as well as the reft, difcoverable by our fenfes, which are fcarce acute enough to look into the pure effences of things,

:

§ 26.

IF thofe ideas, which are conftantly joined to all others, muft therefore be concluded to be the effence of those things, which have conftantly those ideas joined to them, and are infeparable from them; then unity is without doubt the effence of every thing. For there is not any object of sensation or reflection, which does not carry

with it the idea of one: but the weakness of this kind' of argument we have already thown fufficiently.

§ 27. Ideas of Space and Solidity diftinct.

To conclude, whatever men thall think concerning the existence of a vacuum, this is plain to me, that we have as clear an idea of Space diftinct from folidity, as we have of folidity diftinct from motion, or motion from space. We have not any two more diftinct ideas, and we can as eafily conceive fpace without folidity, as we can conceive body or space without motion; though it be ever fo certain, that neither body nor motion can exift without space. But whether any one will take space to be only a relation refulting from the exiftence of other beings at a distance, or whether they will think the words of the most knowing king Solomon, The heaven, and the heaven of heavens cannot contain thee; or thofe more emphatical ones of the infpired philofopher St. Paul, In him we live, move, and have our being; are to be un-, derstood in a literal fenfe, I leave every one to confider only our idea of Space is, I think, fuch as I have mentioned, and diftinct from that of body. For whether we confider in matter itself the distance of its coherent folid parts, and call it, in refpect of those folid parts, extenfion; or whether, confidering it as lying between the extremities of any body in its feveral di̟menfions, we call it length, breadth, and thickness ; or elfe confidering it as lying between any two bodies, or pofitive beings, without any confideration. whether there be any matter or no between, we call. it diftance: however named or confidered, it is always. the fame uniform fimple idea of Space, taken from objects about which our fenfes have been converfant;. whereof having fettled ideas in our minds, we can revive, repeat, and add them one to another as often as we will, and confider the fpace or diftance fo imag-ined, either as filled with folid parts, fo that another body cannot come there, without difplacing and thrufting out the body that was there before; or elfe as void of folidity, fo that a body of equal dimenfions to that empty or pure fpace, may be placed in it,

without the removing or expulfion of any thing that was there. But, to avoid confufion in difcourfes concerning this matter, it were poffibly to be wifhed that the name extenfion were applied only to matter, or the diftance of the extremities of particular bodies; and the term expansion to space in general, with or without folid matter poffeffing it, fo as to fay Space is expanded, and body extended. But in this every one has his liberty: I propofe it only for the more clear and distinct way of fpeaking.

28. Men differ little in clear fimple Ideas. THE knowing precifely what our words ftand for, would, I imagine, in this as well as a great many other cafes, quickly end the difpute. For I am apt to think that men, when they come to examine them, find their fimple ideas all generally to agree, though in discourse with one another they perhaps confound one another with different names. I imagine that men who abstract their thoughts, and do well examine the ideas of their own minds, cannot much differ in thinking; however they may perplex themselves with words, according to the way of fpeaking of the feveral fchools or fects they have been bred up in: though amongst unthinking men, who examine not fcrupuloufly and carefully their own ideas, and strip them not from the marks men ufe for them, but confound them with words, there must be endless difpute, wrangling, and jargon: efpe-. cially if they be learned bookifh men, devoted to some fect, and accustomed to the language of it, and have learned to talk after others. But if it fhould happen, that any two thinking men should really have different ideas, I do not fee how they could difcourfe or argue one with another. Here I must not be mistaken, to think that every floating imagination in men's brains is prefently of that fort of ideas I fpeak of. It is not eafy for the mind to put off those confused notions and prejudices it has imbibed from cuftom, inadvertency, and cominon converfation: it requires pains and affiduity. to examine its ideas, till it refolves them into those clear and diftinct fimple ones out of which they are

compounded; and to fee which, amongst its fimple ones, have or have not a neceffary connection and dependence one upon another. Till a man doth this in the primary and original notion of things, he builds upon floating and uncertain principles, and will often find himself at a lofs.

CHAP. XIV.

OF DURATION, AND ITS SIMPLE MODES.

§ 1. Duration is fleeting Extenfion.

THERE is another fort of distance or length, the idea whereof we get not from the permanent parts of space, but from the fleeting and perpetually perifhing parts of fucceffion. This we call duration, the fimple modes whereof any different lengths of it, whereof we have diftinct ideas, as hours, days, years, &c. time and eternity.. § 2. Its Idea from Reflection on the Train of our Ideas. THE anfwer of a great man, to one who asked what time was, Si non rogas intelligo (which amounts to this, the more I fet myself to think of it, the lefs I underftand it) might perhaps perfuade one, that time, which reveals all other things, is itself not to be discovered. Duration, time, and eternity, are, not without reason, thought to have something very abftrufe in their nature. But however remote these may feem from our comprehenfion, yet if we trace them right to their originals, I doubt not but one of those sources of all our knowledge, viz. fenfation and reflection, will be able to furnish us with thefe ideas, as clear and distinct as many other which are thought much lefs obfcure; and we shall find, that the idea of eternity itself is derived from the ne common original with the rest of our ideas.

- §3.

1 understand time and eternity aright, we ought with attention to confider what idea it is we have of duration, and how we came by it. It is evident to any one,