fes, I can imagine, that light existed three days before the fun was, or had any motion, barely by thinking, that the duration of light before the fun was created, was fo long as (if the fun had moved then as it doth now) would have been equal to three of his diurnal revolutions; fo, by the fame way, I can have an idea of the chaos, or angels, being created, before there was either light, or any continued motion, a minute, an hour, a day, a year, or 1000 years. For if I can but confider duration equal to one minute, before either the being or motion of any body, I can add one minute more till I come to fixty; and by the fame way of adding minutes, hours, or years (i. e. fuch or such parts of the fun's revolutions, or any other period whereof I have the idea) proceed in infinitum, and suppose a duration exceeding as many fuch parts as I can reckon, let me add whilst I will; which I think is the notion we have of eternity, of whofe infinity we have no other notion than we have of the infinity of number, to which we can add for ever without end.

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AND thus I think it is plain, that from those two fountains of all knowledge before mentioned, viz. reflection and fenfation we get the ideas of duration, and the meafures of it.

For, firft, by obferving what paffes in our minds, how our ideas there in train conftantly fome vanish, and othe ers begin to appear, we come by the idea of fucceffion.

Secondly, By obferving a diftance in the parts of this fucceffion, we get the idea of duration.

Thirdly, By fenfation obferving certain appearances, at certain regular and feeming equidiftant periods, we get the ideas of certain lengths or measures of duration, as minutes, hours, days, years, &c.

Fourthly, By being able to repeat those measures of time, our ideas of ftated length of duration in our minds, as often as we will, we can come to imagine duration, where nothing does really endure or exift; and thus we imagine to-morrow, next year, or seven years

hence.

Fifthly, By being able to repeat any fuch idea of any length of time, as of a minute, a year, or an age, as often as we will in our own thoughts, and adding them to one another, without ever coming to the end of such addition, any nearer than we can to the end of number, to which we can always add, we come by the idea of eternity, as the future eternal duration of our fouls, as well as the eternity of that infinite Being, which must neceffarily have always exifted.

Sixthly, By confidering any part of infinite duration, as fet out by periodical measures, we come by the idea of what we call time in general.

CHAP. XV.

OF DURATION AND EXPANSION, CONSIDERED TOGETHER.

61. Both capable of greater and lefs.

THOUGH we have, in the precedent chapters, dwelt pretty long on the confiderations of space and duration, yet they being ideas of general concernment, that have fomething very abftrufe and peculiar in their nature, the comparing them one with another may perhaps be of ufe for their illuftration; and we may have the more clear and diftinct conception of them, by taking a view of them together. Distance or space, in its fimple abftract conception, to avoid confufion, I call expanfion, to distinguish it from extenfion, which by fome is used to exprefs this distance only, as it is in the folid parts of matter, and fo includes, or at least intimates, the idea of body: whereas the idea of pure diftance includes no fuch thing. I prefer alfo the word expanfion to space, becaufe fpace is often applied to diftance of fleeting fucceffive parts, which never exist together, as well as to thofe which are permanent. In both these (viz. expanfion and duration) the mind has this common idea of continued lengths, capable of greater or lefs quantities: for a man has as clear anidea of

the difference of the length of an hour, and a day, as of an inch and a foot.

§ 2. Expanfion not bounded by Matter.

THE mind, having got the idea of the length of any part of expansion, let it be a span or a pace, or what length you will, can, as has been faid, repeat that idea; and fo adding it to the former, enlarge its idea of length, and make it equal to two fpans, or two paces; and fo as often as it will, till it equals the diftance of any parts of the earth one from another, and increase thus, till it amounts to the distance of the fun, or remotest star. By fuch a progreffion as this, fetting out from the place, where it is, or any other place, it can proceed and pass beyond all those lengths, and find nothing to ftop its going on, either in or without body. It is true, we can eafily in our thoughts come to the end of folid extenfion; the extremity and bounds of all body we have no difficulty to arrive at : but when the mind is there, it finds nothing to hinder its progress into this endlesfs expanfion; of that it can neither find nor conceive any end. Nor let any one say, that beyond the bounds of body, there is nothing at all, unless he will confine GOD within the limits of matter. Solomon, whofe understanding was filled, and enlarged with wifdom, feems to have other thoughts, when he fays, Heaven, and the heaven of heavens, cannot contain thee: and he, I think, very much magnifies to himself the capacity of his own understanding, who perfuades himself, that he can extend his thoughts farther than GOD exists, or imagine any expanfion where he is not.

§ 3. Nor Duration by Motion.

JUST fo it is in duration. The mind, having got the idea of any length of duration, can double, multiply, and enlarge it, not only beyond its own, but beyond the existence of all corporeal beings, and all the measures of time, taken from the great bodies of the world, and their motions. But yet every one eafily admits, that though ! we make duration boundless, as certainly it is, we cannot yet extend it beyond all being. GOD, every one eafily allows, fills eternity; and it is hard to find a reaVOL. I.

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fon, why any one fhould doubt, that he likewife fills immenfity. His infinite being is certainly as boundlefs one way as another; and methinks it afcribes a little too much to matter, to fay, where there is no body, there is nothing.

4. Why Men more eafily admit infinite Duration, than infinite Expansion

Hence, I think, we may learn the reafon why every one familiarly, and without the leaft hefitation, fpeaks of and fuppofes eternity, and sticks not to afcribe infinity to duration; but it is with more doubting and referve, that many admit, or fuppofe the infinity of space. The reafon whereof feems to me to be this, that duration and extenfion being ufed as names of affections belonging to other beings, we eafily conceive in GOD infinite duration; and we cannot avoid doing fo: but not attributing to him extenfion, but only to matter, which is finite, we are apter to doubt of the existence of expanfion without matter; of which alone we commonly fuppofe it an attribute. And therefore, when men purfue their thoughts of space, they are apt to ftop at the confines of body; as if space were there at an end too, and reached no farther. Or if their ideas, upon confideration carry them farther, yet they term what is beyond the limits of the univerfe, imaginary fpace; as if it were nothing, because their is nobody exifting in it. Whereas duration, antecedent to all body, and to the, motions which it is meafured by, they never term imaginary; because it is never fuppofed void of fome other real exiftence. And if the names of things may at all direct our thoughts towards the originals of men's ideas. (as I am apt to think they may very much) one may have occafion to think, by the name duration, that the continuation of exiftence, with a kind, of refiftance to any destructive force, and the continuation of folidity (which is apt to be confounded with,and, if we look into the minute anatomical parts of matter, is little different from hardness) were thought to have fome analogy, and: gave occafion to words fo near of kin as durare and durum effe. And that durare is applied to the idea of hard

nefs, as well as that of exiftence, we fee in Horace Epod. 16, ferro duravit fæcula. But be that as it will, this is certain, that whoever pursues his own thoughts, will find them fometimes launch out beyond the extent of body into the infinity of space or expanfion; the idea whereof is diftinct and feparate from body, and all other things which may (to those who pleafe) be a fubject of farther meditation.

§ 5. Time to Duration is as place to Expanfion. TIME in general is to duration, as place to expansion. They are fo much of those boundlefs oceans of eternity and immensity, as is fet out and diftinguished from the reft, as it were by land-marks; and fo are made ufe of to denote the pofition of finite real beings, in refpect one to another, in thofe uniform infinite oceans of duration and fpace. Thefe, rightly confidered, are only ideas of determinatediftances, from certain known points fixed in. diftinguishable fenfible things, and fuppofed to keep the fame diftance one from another. From fuch points fixed in fenfible beings we reckon, and from them we measure our portions of thofe infinite quantities; which, fo confidered, are that which we call time and place. Fór duration and space being in themselves uniforin and boundlefs, the order and pofition of things, without fuch known fettled points, would be loft in them; and all things would lie jumbled in an incurable confufion. § 6. Time and Place are taken for fo much of either, as

are fet out by the Exiflence and Motion of Bodies. TIME and place taken thus for determinate diftinguishable portions of thofe infinite abyffes of space and duration, fet out, or supposed to be diftinguithed from the reft by marks, and known boundaries, have each of them a twofold acceptation.

FIRST, Time in general is commonly taken for fo much of infinite duration, as is meafured out by, and co-exiftent with, the existence and motions of the 'greatbodies of the univerfe, as far as we know any thing of them and in this fenfe, time begins and ends with the frame of this fenfible world, as in thefe phrafes before, mentioned, before all time, or when time shall be no more. Place likewife is taken fometimes for that portion of in