notions in this as well as other things; whilft the lazy and inconfiderate part of men, making far the greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, becaufe all wife men had it, virtue too muft be thought innate, for that alfo wife men have always had.

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THIS was evidently the cafe of all Gentilifm; nor hath even amongst Jews, Chriftians, and Mahometans, who acknowledge but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in thofe nations to teach men to have true notions. of a GOD, prevailed fo far as to make men to have the fame, and true ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the fhape of a man, fitting in heaven, and to have many other abfurd and unfit conceptions of him? Chriftians, as well as Turks, have had whole fects owning and contending earneftly for it, that the Deity was corporeal, and of human thape: and though we find few amongst us who profefs themfelves Anthrop omorphites (though fome I have met with that own it) yet I believe he that will make it his bufinefs, may find, amongst the ignorant and uninftructed Chrif tians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almoft of any age, or young people, almoft of any condition; and you fhall find, that though the name of GOD be frequently in their mouths; yet the notions they apply this name to, are fo odd, low and pitiful, that nobody can imagine they were taught by a rational man, much less that they were characters written by the finger of God himself. Nor do I fee how it derogates more from the goodnefs of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with thefe ideas of himfelf, than that he hath fent us into the world with bodies unclothed, and that there is no art or skill born with us: for, being fitted with faculties to attain thefe, it is want of induftry and confideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It

is as certain that there is a God, as that the oppofite angles, made by the interfection of two ftraight lines, are equal. There was never any rational creature, that fet himself fincerely to examine the truth of these propofitions, that could fail to affent to them; though yet it be paft doubt, that there are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmost of its extent) univerfal confent, fuch an one I eafily allow; but fuch an univerfal. confent as this, proves not the idea of GOD, any more than it does the idea of fuch angles, innate.

§ 17. If the Idea of God be not Innate, no other can befuppofed Innate.

SINCE then though the knowledge of a GODbe the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as, I think is evident, from what has been faid; I imagine there will scarce be any other idea found, that can pretend to it: fince if God had fet any im preffion, any character on the understanding of men, it is most reasonable to expect it fhould have been fome clear and uniform idea of himself, asi far as our weak capacities were capable to receive fo incomprehenfible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea, which we are moft concerned, to have, it is afrong prefumption against all other innate characters. I muft own, as far as I can obferve, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other PR

18. Idea of Subftance not Innate.

I CONFESS there is another idea, which would be of gen- eral ufe for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of fubftance, which we neither have, nor can have, by fenfation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they should be fuch, as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves: but we fee, on the contrary, that fince by thofe ways, whereby our ideas are brought into our minds, this is not; we have no fuch clear idea at all, and therefore fignify nothing by,

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the word fubftance, but only an uncertain fuppofition of we know not what, i. e. (of fome thing whereof we have no particular diftinct pofitive) idea, which we take to be the fubftratum, or fupport, of thofe ideas we do

know.

§ 19. No propofition can be Innate, fince no Ideas are Innate.

WHATEVER then we talk of Innate, either Speculative or practical principles, it may, with as much probability, be faid that a man hath 1001. Sterling in his pocket, and yet denied that he had either penny,fhilling, crown, or any othercoin, out of which the fum is to be made up, as to think that certain propofitions are innate, when the ideas about which they are can byno means be fuppofed to befo. The general reception and affent that is given, doth not, at all prove that the ideas expreffed inthem are innate: for in many cafes, however the ideas came there, the affent to words, expreffing the agreement or difagreement of fuch ideas, will neceffarily follow. Every one, that hath a true idea of God and worship, will affent to this propofition, That God is to be worshipped, when expreffed in a language he understands: and every ra tional man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to affent to this propofition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well fuppofed to want one or both of thofe ideas to-day. For if we will allow favages and moft country people to have ideas of God and quorfhip (which converfation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few children can be supposed to have thofe ideas, which therefore they muft begin to have fome time or other; and then they will alfo begin to affent to that propofition, and make very little queftion of it ever after. But fuch an affent upon hearing, no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the fun, or light, or faffron, or yellow; because, when his fight is cleared, he will certainly affent to this propofition, That the fun is lucid, or that faffron is yellow and therefore if fuch an affent upon hearing

cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much lefs thepropofitions made up of thofe ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

No Innate Ideas in the Memory.

To which let me add: if there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness, that it was known or perceived before: without this, whatever idea comes into the mind is new, and not remembered; this consciousness of its having been in the mind before, being that which diftinguishes remembering from all other ways of thinking. Whatever idea was never perceived by the mind, was never in the mind. Whatever idea is in the mind, is either an actual perception; or elfe, having been an actual perception, is fo in the mind, that by the memory it can be made an actual perception, again. Whenever there is the actual perception of an idea without memory, the idea appears perfectly new and unknown before to the understanding. Whenever the memory brings any idea into actual view, it is with a consciousness that it had been there before, and was not wholly a stranger to the mind. Whether this be not fo, I appeal to every one's obfervation: and then I defire an inftance of an idea, pretended to be innate, which (before any impreffion of it by ways hereafter to be mentioned) any one could revive and remember as an idea he had formerly known, without which consciousness of a former perception, there is no remembrance; and whatever idea comes into the mind without that confcioufnefs is not remembered, or comes not out of the memory, nor can be faid to be in the mind before that appearance: for what is not either actually in view, or in the memory, is in the mind,

no way at all, and is all one as if it never had been there. Suppofe a child had the ufe of his eyes, till he knows and diftinguishes colours ; but then cataracts fhut the windows, and he is forty or fifty years perfectly in the dark, and in that time perfectly lofes all memory of the ideas of colours he once had. This was the cafe of a blind man I once talked with, who loft his fight by the fmall-pox when he was a child, and had no more notion of colours than one born blind. I afk, Whether any one can fay this man had then any ideas of colours in his mind, any more than one born blind? And. I think nobody will fay, that either of them had in his mind any idea of colours at all. His cataracts are couched, and then he has the ideas (which he remembers not) of colours, de novo, by his restored fight conveyed to his mind, and that without any confcioufnefs of a former acquaintance and these now he can revive, and call to mind in the dark.. In this cafe all thefe ideas of colours, which, when out of view can be revived with a con sciousness of a former acquaintance, being thus in the memory are faid to be in the mind. The ufe I make of this, is, that whatever idea, being not actually in view, is in the mind, is there only by being in the memory and if it be not in the memory, it is not in the mind; and if it be in the memory, it cannot by the memory be brought into actual view, without a per ception that it comes out of the memory; which is this, that it had been known before, and is now re-. membered. If therefore there be any innate ideas, they must be in the memory, or elfe no where in the mind; and if they be in the memory, they can be revived without any impreffion from without; and whenever they are brought into the mind, they are remembered, i. e. they bring with them a perception of their not being wholly new to it. This being a conftant and diftinguifhing difference between what is, and what is not in the memory, or in the mind; that what is not in the memory, whenever it appears there, ap pears perfectly new and unknown before; and what is

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