ing of an unfilled Destiny, the restless wavings of uncertain Hopes, are in the heart of every man who has risen but a step above the animal life. The more we know of what passes in the minds of others, the more our friends disclose to us their secret consciousness, the more do we learn that no man is peculiar in his moral experience, that beneath the smoothest surface of outward life lie deep cares of the heart, — and that, if we fall under our burdens, we fall beneath the temptations that are common to man, the existence of which others as little suspect in us as we do in them. We have but the trials that are incident to humanity; there is nothing peculiar in our case, and we must take up our burdens in faith of heart that, if we are earnest, and trifle not with temptation, God will support us, as, in the past fidelity of his Providence, he has supported others as heavily laden as ourselves.

J. H. Thom.

Our whole life is startlingly Moral. There is never an instant's truce between virtue and vice. Goodness is the only investment that never fails. In the music of the harp which trembles round the world, it is the insisting on this which thrills us.

Though the youth at last grow indifferent, the laws of the universe are not indifferent, but are forever on the side of the most sensitive. Listen to every zephyr for some reproof, for it is surely there, and he is unfortunate who does not hear it. We cannot touch a string or move a stop, but the charming moral transfixes us. Many an

irksome noise, go a long way off, is heard as music, a proud, sweet satire on the meanness of our lives.

Thoreau.

The postulates of geometry no man can deny, those of moral science are such as no good man will deny. For it is not in our power to disclaim our nature as sentient beings; but it is in our power to disclaim our nature as moral beings. Were it otherwise, the Creed would stand in the same relation to morality as the multiplication table.

This, then, is the distinction of moral philosophy, that I assume a something, the proof of which no man can give to another, yet every man may find for himself.

Coleridge.

Nothing seems important to me but so far as it is connected with morals. If the mind cannot feel and treat mathematics, and music, and every thing else as a trifle, it has been seduced and enslaved. Cecil.

There is only one real, permanent distinction, that is, between good and evil; within this there are a million of others, some absolutely wrong, some venial, some even desirable as expedients, but all defective, all temporary; we should be ever trying to get rid of them all one by Oakfield.

one.

Many other distinctions, such as of the high and the

low minded, the generous and the mean, may be resolved into this great one.

Thus, to let the expression take the place of the deed, to use gifts or graces as commodities and means of popularity, to court those who are indifferent to us, and neglect those of whom we are sure, may be called mean and worldly, or in one word wrong.

Every man's style, or rate of morality, at any given period of his life, is the slowly ripened product of his entire course up to that moment, influenced as it has been, by secular engagements, by social alliances, and especially by the salubrity or the infected condition of the moral atmosphere he has breathed. Isaac Taylor.

The struggle of his heart was not to embrace heaven and earth by turns, and thus turn both to the ashes of despair. Sylvester Judd.

Some writers would persuade us, that the moral Faculty is all very well as one of the elements of human nature, is highly respectable in its proper place among the rest, and could not be absent without leaving a grievous gap, interruptive of the symmetry of the man; but that it must aspire to no more than this modest participation with its companions in the perfection of our being; that it must not presume to meddle with what does not belong to it, or refuse to make liberal concessions to the demands of beauty, expediency, and self-love; and that it

would be very narrow-minded, or, in fashionable phrase, very one-sided, to try every thing before the tribunal of this solitary power. Here also is a complete denial of responsibility. Something, it is true, appears to be allowed to conscience; a part is given it to play; and the point professedly disputed is not its existence with an appropriate function, but its exclusive pretensions and absolute authority. Unhappily, however, when this much is discarded, it is only in semblance that any thing remains. A moral faculty with a merely concurrent jurisdiction, or from whose decisions there is some appeal, is a palpable self-contradiction. Martineau.

Do we want to know whether the distinctions of right and wrong, as they appear to our puny intellects, are identical with the distinctions perceived by His omniscience. The answer is clear. That knowledge which we possess He gave. Our intuition is His tuition. The fun damental axioms of the reason were given by Him to afford us a basis of thought. Even the inductions of the understanding are all drawn by the mental machinery with which He has provided us, from the visible universe His hands have made.

The only difference which can exist between divine and human knowledge of moral distinctions is, that God knows all the goodness of good · all the evil of evil, and we know but a part of either.

An Essay on Intuitive Morals.

The law of the Will must be found in the Reason, that is, in our power of immediate intuition as to the ends of our being and foundations of our constitution. But, if so, there is no answer to the inquiry why we regard guilt in ourselves with a different feeling from that with which we behold all other confusion and ruin; with a feeling which does not decide what is right and wrong, but one which, the fact of the right and wrong being given, attaches to these a sense or emotion of approval and blame. I speak not of the moral law, but of the moral Sanction.

Sterling.

Science is nature seen by the reason, and not merely by the senses. Science exists in the mind, and in the mind alone. No science ever defines its object-noun. For instance unity, quantity, space, force, matter, value, are all incapable of definition; but forms of unity, forms of quantity, forms of space, &c., are capable of definition. If the reader supposes that a science ought to define its object-noun, he has only to refer to the mathematical sciences, not one of which ever attempts to offer a definition of its noun substantive major. Were a geometrician to offer the smallest speculation as to what space is, he would have departed altogether from the province of geometric science. Theory of Human Progression.

This is equally true in moral science.

Before we can define Ethics, we must find the special quality in human nature on which moral phenomena de