or mechanic in his trade. If fair means be then employed, there is no doubt of a sufficiently studious bias being given to the mind; but if study be not relieved by play, or be continued too long at one time, or be of a nature in itself repugnant to the young mind, a taste for it never will be acquired, and never ought to be acquired; which is just one of the wise provisions of nature, in which any process of forcing ever defeats its own purpose. It is not always the best sign of a boy that he is fonder of his books than of his play. The mind may grow at the expense of the body, and as a plant shooting up out of a sterile soil, but under a genial atmosphere, "to-day will flourish and to-morrow die;" so the mental powers may thus soon spring to maturity, but unless they derive much of their strength and action from a sound constitution, by inhaling too largely of an atmosphere of science and literature, they may not only as speedily decay, but, at the same time, irrecoverably injure the bodily constitution.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE second branch of education according to the preceding division, has a reference to the intellectual nature of man. In tracing the connexion of the moving powers of the body up through the bones, the muscles, the nerves, the spinal cord, and the brain, it was stated that these all depend for action upon the will. It may now further be remarked, that the will presides no less over the actions of the mental faculties than of the bodily; in short, that it governs the whole man. Yet is this will no irresponsible agent, nor less guided in its operations by these same faculties, than are the nerves and muscles by it. It may have the direction of the conduct and movements, but it acts and moves itself by direction. It may be the ruling power, but it must receive power to rule, and that power is vested in the understanding. It is this which suggests motives of action to the will, or moves the will to act. "No man," says Locke, ever sets himself about anything but upon some view or other, which serves him as a reason for what he does," and this reason must be contained in the understanding. His motives arise, too, from ideas contained in the understanding; upon the correctness or incorrectness of which, must his conduct depend for its propriety, or impropriety. These ideas are only of two kinds, those prepared by the mind itself, or reflective ideas, which are again derived

Now

from others received by the senses, or sensations. as these sensations proceed from objects external to the mind and the body, the whole man, properly speaking, is an agent acting to this extent under the influence of external circumstances. But these circumstances are laws ordained and controlled by Providence, and hence the responsibility of man for his conduct to the Great Creator, as an agent acting under his control and government. During the earliest years of his life, however, a term of apprenticeship must be gone through to qualify him for this agency, and until he be so qualified, he is under the control and direction of a subordinate. That subordinate is a parent, or an instructor, whose province it is to guide him into a proper relation to these laws, that by bringing them to bear upon his understanding, it may be enlightened so as to induce the will to perform right actions; and also qualified for judging of the rectitude of these actions when performed. The understanding must be shown in what direction the laws of nature and Providence tend, that the will may be swayed, and the conduct borne along in the same direction; but if a perverted view of these be given, the conduct will exhibit a corresponding obliquity. If in physical motion, the desires of the will may be thwarted by organic derangement, so the operation of these natural laws may also be refracted, and turned aside, by entering the medium of a perverted understanding. Whatever powers of body or mind, then, the will employs in accomplishing a purpose, it must have had a previous motive communicated to it to do so, and that motive would be a reason produced by the understanding. Any reason would be sufficiently moving to the will, but it must have some reason for moving; if that reason be an enlightened one, the right path of conduct will be shown and entered upon, but if

unenlightened, that path is left in darkness. There is, therefore, no part of education more important in its results than the regulation of the understanding, either as regards its acquirements or manifestations, its knowledge or its power.

A general division of the mind into its separate faculties may best point out the course that should be pursued in its guidance. Modern philosophy arranges these faculties into two classes-feelings and intellect. The former are subdivided into propensities and sentiments, and the latter into powers of perception and reflection. The propensities induce desires, inclinations, and instincts, common to the lower animals with man. The sentiments are a higher grade of feelings joined to the propensities, and induce upon them peculiar emotions. Some of these sentiments are also common to man with the lower animals; but what are called superior sentiments are possessed by man alone.

Again, the intellect is divided into perceptive and reflective faculties. The former perceive the existence of external objects, their qualities and relations, also embracing the faculty of language. This order is the earliest developed, and is limited to the acquisition of knowledge. The reflective faculties are two in number, comparison and reason, and are developed at a maturer age. The former, as its name imports, compares ideas together to show their differences and resemblances, and is the source of wit, oratory, and poetry. The latter, and the noblest power of the mind, is reason, that faculty designed to observe cause and effect, deducing thence principles of guidance for the moral conduct, and those laws upon which the whole material universe depends. Reason is thus not only the distinguishing characteristic between man and the lower animals, giving him a power over their

superior physical strength; but it enables him in some degree to turn aside the very course of nature for his own benefit. This branch of the human intellect, too, enables the mind to pry into itself, and examine the laws of its own structure and functions.

Intellectual education, therefore, resolves itself into two branches according to these two divisions of the intellect, the perceptive and reflective powers. A perception of the existence and qualities of objects, is first communicated to the mind by the senses. Look at a little child playing in its mother's lap with a toy; it grasps it with its tiny fingers, and gains a sensation of its hardness; gazes upon it, and receives an impression of its form; puts it to its mouth and tastes it; catches by chance its smell; knocks it against another substance and hears its sound; and there may be seen a process of education going on, from which the instructor may gain his first lesson in the art of teaching. These are the faculties seeking gratification and amusement, and that is the mode to gratify and amuse them. While awake, the senses of a child are ever open to impressions from external objects, and there is an impulse within constantly inciting him to touch, taste, and handle, that he may receive such impressions.

This is a similar instinct of the mind impelling it to obtain knowledge, to that bodily craving which prompts a child to cling to the breast for its material nourishment. The desire should, therefore, be gratified according to its manifestation; but as it would act blindly and might lead to the reception of injurious impressions, it must be guided to suitable objects to imbibe proper impressions. These objects must also be in sufficient number and variety to gratify its ever restless appetite for novelty, and at the same time keep its curiosity awake. But the same