not only equally true, but it is universal among mankind, and unchangeable. It describes facts of appearance. And what other language would have been consistent with the divine wisdom? The inspired writers must have borrowed their terminology, either from the crude and mistaken philosophy of their own times, and so have sanctified and perpetuated falsehood, unintelligible meantime to all but one in ten thousand; or they must have anticipated the terminology of the true system, without any revelation of the system itself, and so have become unintelligible to all men; or lastly, they must have revealed the system itself, and thus have left nothing for the exercise, developement, or reward of the human understanding, instead of teaching that moral knowledge, and enforcing those social and civic virtues, out of which the arts and sciences will spring up in due time, and of their own accord. But nothing of this applies to the materialist; he

refers to the very same facts, which the common language of mankind speaks of: and these too are facts, that have their sole and entire being in our own consciousness; facts, as to which esse and conscire are identical. Now, whatever is common to all languages, in all climates, at all times, and in all stages of civilization, must be the Exponent and Consequent of the common consciousness of man, as man. Whatever contradicts this universal language, therefore, contradicts the universal consciousness, and the facts in question subsisting exclusively in consciousness, whatever contradicts the consciousness, contra dicts the fact. Q. E. D.

I have been seduced into a dry dis cussion, where I had intended only a few amusing facts in proof, that the mind makes the sense, far more than the senses make the mind. If I have life and health, and leisure, I purpose to compile ffrom the works, memoirs, transactions, &c. of the different philosophical so

cieties in Europe, from magazines, and the rich store of medical and psychologi cal publications furnished by the English, French, and German press, all the essays. and cases, that relate to the human faculties under unusual circumstances (for pathology is the crucible of physiology); excluding such only as are not intelligible without the symbols or terminology of science. These I would arrange under the different senses and powers as the eye, the ear, the touch, &c.; the imitative power, voluntary and automatic; the imagination, or shaping and modifying power; the fancy, or the aggregative and associative power; the understanding, or the regulative, substantiating, and realizing power; the specula tive reason,..vis theoretica et scientifica, or the power, by which we produce, or aim to produce, unity, necessity, and universality in all our knowledge by means of principles a priori; the will, or practi

* This phrase, a priori, is in common most grossly misunderstood, and an absurdity burthened on it which

cal reason; the faculty of choice (Germanicè, Willkiihr,) and (distinct both from the moral will, and the choice) the sensation of volition, which I have found reason to include under the head of single and double touch. Thence I propose to make a new arrangement of madress, whether as defect, or as excess of any of these senses or faculties; and thus by appropriate cases to shew the difference between, I. a man, having lost his reason, but not his senses or understanding-that is, he sees things as other men see them; he adapts means to ends, as other men would adapt them, and not seldom, with more sagacity; but his final

it does not deserve! By knowledge a priori, we do not mean that we can know any thing previously to experience, which would be a contradiction in terms; but that having once known it by occasion of experience, (i. e. something acting upon us from without) we then know, that it must have pre-existed, or the experience itself would have been impossible. By experience only I know, that I have eyes; but then my reason convinces me, that I must have had eyes in order to the experience.

II. His

end is altogether irrational. having lost his wits, i. e. his understanding or judicial power; but not his reason, or the use of his senses. Such was Don Quixote; and, therefore, we love and reverence him, while we de spise Hudibras. III. His being out of his senses, as is the case of an hypochondrist, to whom his limbs appear to be of glass. Granting that, all his conduct is both rational (or moral) and prudent; IV. or the case may be a combination of all three, though I doubt the existence of such a case; or of any two of them; V. or lastly, it may be merely such an excess of sensation, as overpowers and suspends all; which is frenzy or raving madness.

A diseased state of an organ of sense, or of the inner organs connected with it, will perpetually tamper with the understanding, and unless there be an energetie and watchful counteraction of the judgment (of which I have known more