pensation of mercy, to reform the wicked; a tendency, which is in many cases effectual, and which would be so in all cases, were it not counteracted by other causes. In respect to this subject, the Scripture leads us to make a clear distinction between the state of probation, and of retribution. In the former, the evils which God inflicts on men are corrective or disciplinary, though at the same time suited to show God's justice, and to vindicate his authority. In the latter state, as we understand the word of God, the reformation of the wicked does not come within the design of punishment. The end to be secured relates wholly to the divine character and kingdom. But we cannot accede to Dr. Ware's notion, that disciplinary punishment may be inflicted by a righteous and benevolent God, without real ill-desert in those who suffer. Is not disciplinary punishment intended for correction and reformation? But what place can there be for correction or reformation in regard to those, who are not faulty, or blame-worthy? What need of reformation? And what occasion for correction? Suppose punishment is laid upon them. How can it produce any good effect? Certainly not according to any physical laws. The effect to be produced is in the mind, and must be produced, if produced at all, according to the laws of our intelligent and moral nature. Punishment, to be salutary, must relate to some fault, some moral evil, and must express to us the divine displeasure on account of it. Where this is the case, there is correction; and if we are not refractory, there will be reformation.

I can spend but a few moments upon the views of our Author, p. 52. He thinks that the scheme of Unitarians on the subject of depravity is suited to produce

much greater humility and self-abhorrence, than that of the Orthodox. Those, who are familiarly acquainted with what the advocates of Unitarianism and of Orthodoxy have written on the subject of human corruption, and with the views they respectively entertain as to the proper estimate of our own character, must, I think, be surprised at this opinion of Dr. Ware. The truth is, Unitarians have constantly complained, that the Orthodox make too low an estimate of human virtue; that they indulge too debasing views of human nature, and paint the wickedness of their species in too strong colours. At the same time, Unitarians of an independent, liberal judgment, like Dr. Priestley, have freely acknowledged the tendency of our doctrine of depravity, erroneous as they think it, to promote deep humility. And I have been greatly mistaken, if the repugnancy of the doctrine to the pride of the heart has not occasioned the chief objection against it. Dr. Ware indeed says; "we certainly have no cause to feel ourselves humbled under a sense of any thing we are by nature." But he says it very incautiously. For whatever he may think of those born in Christian lands; he hesitates not to allow that the Ephesians "were by nature children of wrath ;" that is, sinful, and deserving of wrath. Was not this a cause for humility in them? The foundation of Dr. Ware's misapprehension must, I think, be, that he considers native sinfulness to be, in its essential properties, different from the sinfulness exhibited in our life; whereas these two must be regarded as only the commencement, and the continuance of the same thing. "Humility and self-condemna tion," Dr. Ware says, "should spring only from the consciousness of a course of life not answering to the powers, and faculties, and privileges of our nature." Now which should be the occasion of greater humility and

self-condemnation to a man, the consciousness that such a course as this has extended through one or two years, or that it has extended through his whole life? Sin must be considered as essentially the same thing, whether it begin sooner or later. And other things being equal, a man's guilt is proportionate to the duration of his sinfulness. Dr. Ware and other writers distinguish native wickedness from active, voluntary wickedness. But they do it without reason. For that which is native may be as active and voluntary, as that which gets into the mind afterwards. We certainly do not make such a distinction in regard to other things. For example; those appetites which are given us with our original constitution and are therefore called natural, are as strong and active as others. It is true, these appetites have no direct relation to the moral law, and in regard to that law, are neither right nor wrong. But we do not deny their relation to the law because they belong to us from the first. It is simply from a consideration of the real nature of any affection or action of man, and not from a consideration of the time or the occasion of its beginning to exist, that we denominate it good or bad, praise-worthy or blameworthy. If man began to exercise love to God at his first existence, surely our opponents would not, on that account, consider it, as any the less excellent and worthy of approbation. Let any one read what Dr. Ware has written respecting that gratitude, that love of truth, that kindness, and those other dispositions and tendencies to good, which he represents as native properties of man, and see whether there is the least appearance of his considering them any the less amiable or the less amiable or praise-worthy, on that account. Why then should bad dispositions, or tendencies to evil, which are natural, be, for the same reason, considered as any the less odious and blame-worthy?

Dr. Ware has no difficulty in representing men who are born in Christian lands, as having by their birth just what the Ephesians had after their conversion; that is, religion, holiness. But where does he intimate that their holiness was less estimable, because it was a native property?

Our author seems fond of saying and of repeating, that our doctrine ascribes human wickedness to the agency of God; that it traces sin to that constitution which was given us by our Creator, &c. But though all this is admitted, even in the offensive terms he uses; the difficulty is not a whit greater, than what attends his system. He says, that human beings, created innocent and pure, afterwards fall into sin by their own choice, and in the exercise of their own free agency. Now if there is any truth in Philosophy or Revelation, it can be proved that their falling into sin, at any period of their life, is a thing as really to be ascribed to the operation of their Maker, or to the constitution he has given them, as native sinfulness. For suppose, 'according to Dr. Ware's scheme, that a man, influenced by strong temptation, at any time falls into sin. Who gave him a constitution of mind, fitted to be wrought upon by temptation? And who ordered things so, that he should be exposed to temptation, and to those particular temptations which prevail to draw him into sin? Did not God know the result beforehand? Was it not a result which naturally flowed from causes, which God directed and controlled, operating upon a moral nature which he created, and according to laws which he established? The question I would ask him to solve, is, how, in such a case, there can be any blame? blame? I am far from saying, that no difficulty attends the scheme of native depravity, in this respect. But the difficulty is, in my view, no greater, than what attends any other scheme.

But I must check my inclination to pursue this metaphysical mode of reasoning; though it must be allowed that I have an apology, in the metaphysical nature of the arguments to be confuted. I will just add, that the habit of attributing moral evil to God in such a way as to destroy or diminish its criminality, is, in my view, one of the worst habits, of which the human mind is capable. It produces alarming stupidity of conscience and hardness of heart, and leads to the most destructive fatalism.

CHAPTER VIII.

As to the practical importance of the subject of native depravity, which has now been discussed at such length, any man may be satisfied, who will maturely consider what connexion it must have with our views, generally, of Christian truth and piety. It is not enough to say, that the denial of the original, native corruption of man does in fact go in company with such and such notions of Christianity, It may be shown, and it must be remembered, that the connexion, which exists in fact, is not accidental, but arises directly from the nature of the subject. If we believe that our moral disease results from our moral constitution,-that it is inwrought in our very nature; we shall surely have different views of the remedy that is necessary, from what we should have, if we considered our disease as merely accidental, or as less deep and radical. Just as it is in regard to a bodily disease. If it is a slight, superficial disorder, which first appeared but yesterday, or which has appeared but a

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