ally given cannot afford any argument against native depravity. If sin exists in any moral agent, it must have had a beginning. But whether it began at one time or another, is not a circumstance which affects its nature. Suppose it began to exist at a period after the commencement of moral agency; it must have consisted radically in a wrong disposition or affection of heart. If an outward act is sinful, it is sinful because it is the expres sion or effect of that wrong disposition. Suppose now that moral evil began to exist at the very commencement of moral agency; still it must have consisted precisely in the same thing, that is, in a sinful affection or disposition. In this respect there is no difference. Do you say that, in the last case, the supposed disposition or affection could not have been really sinful, because there was no preceding exercise of moral agency which could be its cause? I answer, the same is true, in case moral evil is supposed to begin at any subsequent period. It is perfectly clear, that the first sinful affection or disposition cannot be consequent upon any preceding act of moral agency, as its proper cause, unless a right act can be the cause of a wrong one; or unless there can be a sinful act before the first sinful act, and that sinful act, which is before the first, can be the cause of the first. But it surely needs no proof, that all the exercises of moral agency, which precede the first existence of moral evil, must be right. Whether therefore the beginning of sinful affection is coeval with the beginning of moral agency, or not, it cannot be derived from any faulty exercise of moral agency, which preceded. But if by men's making themselves sinners, Dr. Ware means that they first become sinners by an act or exercise of theirs which precedes their being sinful, and which of course cannot be sinful itself; this is the same as holding, that the first

existence of sin in man is derived from a sinless exercise, But who ever entertained so absurd an

as its cause.

opinion as this?

But if by men's making themselves sinners, or becoming sinners, Dr. Ware only means that, when they begin to sin, they exercise their intellectual and moral powers, free from coercion; or that the particular sins they commit are voluntary, and that their sinful affections are, in the most proper and perfect sense, their own; then I say, this is all true of those who begin to be sinners, when they first begin to be moral agents. The supposition then of sin's commencing so early, is no more inconsistent with the commands of God, than the supposition of its commencing subsequently.

Sure

Let me say also, that the distinction, above referred to, between what is native or original in moral agents, and what is acquired, is one with which an unbiassed conscience is not likely to give itself any concern. I am, that the divine law has nothing to do with it. The law requires moral agents to love God and man, that is, to be holy. If they are destitute of the holy affection required, whether at the commencement of their moral agency, or afterwards, the law regards them as transgressors. Conscience regards them in the same light. If I look into my heart, and find that I have had a disposition or affection contrary to what the law requires, my conscience condemns me for it. If I have had that sinful disposition for a long time, I feel myself to be so much the more criminal. And if I began to exercise that disposition as soon as I began to be a moral agent, and have exercised it ever since, I must be regarded by myself, and by others, as criminal in a very high degree. Present before a court of justice, and before the world, a man, who has

always shown a lying, malicious, thievish disposition, from the time when he was first capable of showing any disposition; would he not be regarded with deep abhorrence, and sentenced with unsparing severity? It is evident then, that common sense, not trammelled by false reasoning, unites with the word of God in condemning sinful affection, whatever may be the date of its origin. Whether it is the first affection of moral agents, or has its commencement afterwards, it is equally their own. In either case, they are free and unconstrained in exercising it, and possess every thing necessary to render them proper subjects of law, and capable of obedience.

This is a subject on which most writers of the Arminian school have, in my apprehension, fallen into a variety of palpable mistakes. And their mistakes, so far as I am able to judge, have arisen from a wrong notion of moral agency; and their wrong notion of moral agency, from their not attending, with sufficient care, to the properties which the mind actually exhibits, and the laws according to which its operations are, and always must be regulated.

Dr. Ware argues against the doctrine of native depravity, from "the promises and threatenings of religion." But what do these prove? If God promises eternal life to those who obey the law, or to those who repent, and believe the gospel, and threatens destruction to those who do not; does this prove that men are by nature free from moral depravity? Are not such promises and threats just and proper in relation to those who are naturally depraved? If not, it must be because natural depravity destroys moral agency. But we have seen above, that if depravity, beginning at any time, is consistent with moral agency; it is so, if it begins when moral agency begins. And if depravity, beginning so

early, may be consistent with moral agency; why may it not be consistent with "the promises and threatenings of religion ?"

ture.

The last particular to be noticed under this head is, "the whole history of divine dispensations to men." This, our Author thinks, is an argument against the Orthodox doctrine of depravity. I presume he means the history of God's goodness. The argument then would be, that God could not be supposed to show such kindness to men, if they were naturally depraved. But this argument is at once confuted by the representations of Scrip"God maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." Christ represents this as a prominent feature of the divine administration. God is a kind Father, a being of infinite grace, and bestows favours which are wholly undeserved. Plainly then the divine dispensations in the present state, how kind and beneficial soever they may be, cannot be urged as a proof, that men are "naturally innocent and pure."

Fifthly. Dr. Ware alludes "to a great number of particulars," mentioned in the Scriptures, "each of which separately," as he thinks, "seems to imply that mankind come into the world innocent and pure, the objects of the complacency of their Creator." p. 29, 30. He instances only in one, but that alone is, in his opinion, decisive of the question. He refers to the manner in which little children are spoken of by our Saviour, and by the Apostle. Matt. xix. 14. "Suffer little children to come unto me-for of such is the kingdom of heaven." "These," he says, "seem to have been infants, or at least very small children." And he adds; "There is not the slightest intimation, that these children had become the subjects of any great moral change." Then comes

his conclusion.

"But if they were depraved, destitute of holiness, &c. could our Saviour declare respecting them, "of such is the kingdom of God ?"

It will doubtless occur to Dr. Ware, on a review of his Letters, that there is an appearance of a small inconsistency between this passage and some others. He

tells us here, that infants, or very small children, belong to the kingdom of God, without "becoming the subjects of any great moral change ;" and just below it is implied in his reasoning, that they are not "destitute of holiness.” But in p. 20, he describes man in infancy as "destitute of all positive holiness." And p. 41, 42, he represents men by nature as "wanting that personal holiness which is necessary to their becoming members of the kingdom of God," and as needing" a great moral change-in order to their being fit members of that kingdom." Here, infants are destitute of personal holiness, and cannot belong to the kingdom of God without a great moral change; but there, they belong to the kingdom of God as they come into the world, without that moral change.

Let us now return to the reasoning of Dr. Ware from Matt. xix. 14. The question, which contains the point of his argument, is this: "If the children who were brought to our Saviour, were depraved, how could he declare respecting them, of such is the kingdom of God?" I answer, the kingdom of God consists, and will forever consist of those, who have been sinners. All the members of that kingdom will unite in the song; "Unto him who loved us and washed us from our sins in his own blood-be glory and dominion forever." So that their belonging, and being destined to belong to Christ's kingdom, proves nothing as to their native character, except that it was such as to need spiritual wash