ticular resemblance which he bears to them, as individuals. Observation shows that, in regard to the faculties and dispositions of the mind, as well as the structure of the body, parents universally transmit to their offspring a general resemblance, and frequently, a particular, individual resemblance. With respect to each of these, what is more common than to say, that children inherit it, or derive it from their parents? Diseases are said to be hereditary in certain families, where they are observed to descend from generation to generation, and where, at the same time, they evidently result from something originally belonging to the constitution. There is, for example, an hereditary blindness and deafness; an hereditary firmness or weakness of bodily constitution; an hereditary strength or imbecility of mind. A man inherits a slowness or quickness of imagination, a quietness or irritability of temper, &c. Wherever there is an obvious resemblance between children and their parents with respect to any properties of body or mind, especially if that resemblance has been the same for many generations, and is most easily accounted for on the common principle, that children bear the likeness of their parents; we hesitate not to say, those properties are hereditary. And some respectable writers have been led by the particular opinions they have held on the subject, to speak of piety in the same manner. Southey says, "Talents of no ordinary kind, as well as a devotional temper, were hereditary in the family of the Wesleys." I mention it merely to show in what sense the word is used.

Let us now bring this train of remarks to bear directly upon the subject of investigation. Here we are to inquire, whether the circumstances, which lead us to apply the words natural, native, innate, and hereditary, to

such bodily and mental properties, as those above mentioned, do in fact belong to the moral depravity or sinfulness of man. We should pursue this inquiry with special care, because the result must be of great consequence in settling the present controversy.

I say then, that moral depravity is a thing which has been found in the human species from generation to generation. There never has been a single exception in any age. Dr. Ware mentions it as a truth which no one will deny, that all men are sinners. This is not a general, but an universal truth. Every child of Adam has sinned. Moral depravity is as universal as reason, or memory, or social affection, or pity, or any of the bodily appetites. We can as easily find a man without any of these, as without sin. So far then as the universality or constant occurrence of the fact is concerned, there is as much propriety in saying, that moral depravity is natural to man, as that the faculty of reason, or any bodily appetite is.

Another circumstance, which justifies us in applying the epithets innate, natural &c. to human depravity, is, that it shows itself very early. We are indeed incapable of looking into the mind of an infant, and seeing the first emotions of moral evil. It is impossible that our memory should go back to what took place in our own minds, during our infancy. Nor can we have any definite knowledge of what takes place in the minds of others in infancy; because they are unable to exhibit those intelligible signs, which are to us the only medium of access to the mind. But among the earliest things, which our memory can recal in ourselves, or which we are able to observe in others, are the indications and incipient exercises of sinful affection. Now if, as far back as our recollection can go in regard to ourselves, or our observa

tion in regard to others, we uniformly find marks of moral evil; is it not reasonable to think it may exist before? and that we should be perfectly satisfied of its earlier existence, if we could, in any way, trace back to an earlier period, the operations of our own minds, or if children at an earlier period could, by any intelligible signs, indicate to us the moral state of their minds? In order that any affection may show itself by outward signs, and especially that its actings may be distinctly recollected, it must have acquired a certain degree of strength. But is it not according to the law of our nature, that the affection should exist in a lower degree, before that time? We are, indeed, unable to determine how early depraved affection may begin to operate. But considering how early it rises to such strength, as to make itself visible; and considering too the gradual growth of every thing in the mind; can we avoid the conclusion, that it probably exists, though in a feebler state, much sooner than it becomes visible? May it not be with our moral nature in this respect, as it is with the peculiar properties of an eagle, a serpent, or a lion, which have always been considered as existing radically in the original constitution of the animal, though they begin to show themselves a considerable time after? Be this, however, as it may; the actual appearance of moral evil in man is, in common cases, very early; so that as far as the period of its first occurrence is concerned, there is a plain reason for calling it natural, or innate.

Another circumstance, distinguishing those things which are properly called natural or innate, or which we say belong to man from the first, is, that they cannot be traced to any change in the constitution of his nature, subsequent to his birth, and do not presuppose such a change. If idiotism is occasioned by a fracture of the

skull, or by the influence of disease, it is not called natural. But if no such calamity has befallen a man, who shows himself to be without understanding, and his want of mind results, as a direct consequence, from his original constitution; in other words, if he never had any mind; and if, with such an original structure, it would be impossible that he ever should have any; then his idiotism is called natural, or he is said to be born an idiot.

Now is the moral depravity of man to be traced to any calamity which has befallen him, or to any change which has taken place in his moral constitution, subsequently to his birth? Does it presuppose that there has been such a change? If a change takes place adequate to account for moral depravity; it must be an universal change, because it must account for the fact, that all are sinners. The position then would be, that, although men are universally born without any disposition or tendency in their nature, which can account for the depravity they afterwards exhibit; a change uniformly takes place, which is the spring of all the moral evil actually found in man. And this change must take place very early, because by the supposition, it must precede the first appearance of moral evil. We have then before us a most important event; an universal change in the moral constitution of man; a change which always takes place very early in childhood, and which satisfactorily accounts for all the sins which mankind commit. Here it becomes a matter of deep interest to inquire, what is the cause of a change, so momentous in its nature, and in its results? Is that cause extraneous to the human mind, or within the mind? If any opponent should say, the cause is extraneous to the mind; then I should wish him to solve the difficulty of supposing, that our moral nature, without any faulty conduct of

cause.

ours, is subjected to the calamitous influence of such a Call that which is the cause of the change, "education, example, and circumstances," as Dr. Ware docs, p. 27. It is a cause, which is extraneous to the mind, and over which, especially at so early a period, we can have little or no control. I should wish Dr. Ware to show, upon his own principles, how we can be accountable for the consequences of a change, produced in such a manner. And before leaving the subject, I should be gratified to know, how he would make it appear consistent, that a God of infinite goodness should expose his feeble, helpless creatures, in the very first stage of their existence, to the operation of a cause so dreadful.

But if the cause of the supposed change is within the mind, it must consist in something which belongs to the original constitution of the mind, or in something which is superinduced upon the mind, after its first existence. If it consists in something which belongs to the original constitution of the mind; then we are thrown back upon the very difficulty which Dr. Ware and others think it so important to shun. But if the cause of the supposed change consists in something which is superinduced upon the mind, after its first existence; it is certainly proper that we should inquire, what that thing is; what has occasioned it, or by what means it has been superinduced upon the mind. And the answer, if there could be an answer to this inquiry, would only make way for another of the same kind, and that for another, and so on indefinitely.

These are some of the difficulties which attend the supposition, that the depravity, which man actually exhibits, is owing to any calamity which befals him, or to any change which takes place in his moral constitution, subsequently to his birth; while on the other hand, the