view in my Letters to Unitarians; and I cheerfully leave it to the judgment of my readers, whether any thing has been offered to diminish their force.

I have now stated the leading considerations, which prove the depravity of man to be native, natural, innate. First. Moral depravity is as universal among men, as reason, memory, or the bodily senses, which are allowed by all to be natural. Second. Depravity shows itself very early; as early as could be expected, on the supposition that it is native; that is, at the earliest period of childhood to which our memory can reach in regard to ourselves, or in which children are able, by intelligible signs, to manifest their feelings to others. Third. The depravity of man cannot be traced to any calamity which befals him, or to any change which takes place in his moral constitution, subsequently to his birth. Fourth. Moral depravity, like other native affections or principles of the mind, is spontaneous in its operations, and hard to be eradicated. Fifth. We can predict concerning any human being, as soon as born, that if he live long enough to exhibit the character of a moral agent, he will certainly be a sinner; and this power of prediction must depend on a settled, uniform cause, a law of our nature.

These, with the Scripture arguments alluded to, are, to say the least, as good reasons why we should believe moral depravity to be a native, original attribute of man, as any which Dr. Ware can have for believing "kindness, gratitude, and love of truth" to be so. I admit that these and other things of like kind, if taken with proper explanations, are as Dr. Ware represents them, natural properties of man. But let him tell us why they are to be considered as natural; and then we may see whether the reasons, which prove them to be natural, are stronger than those which prove human depravity to be so.

9

CHAPTER IV.

THE principal objections urged against the doctrine, which I attempted to defend in the preceding chapter, and the principal difficulties in which it is entangled, will now be made the subject of particular consideration.

Notwithstanding the universal prevalence of moral evil, and all the arguments which have been adduced to prove that it is natural to man, like those other appetites and affections which are, on both sides, regarded in this light; there are, it is said, special reasons against considering moral evil to be a natural property of man; reasons strong enough to countervail all the arguments in favour of the Orthodox doctrine. These reasons are, in brief, that the doctrine of native depravity, is inconsistent with the moral attributes of God, and inconsistent with moral agency in man. Objections like these are arrayed against the common dontrine of native depravity by Dr. Taylor, and many other writers, and are suggested by Dr. Ware in several passages in his Letters.

Here I must take the liberty to remark, as I remarked in my Letters to Unitarians, that the mode of reasoning, introduced by those who urge objections in this manner, is altogether unphilosophical, and can never be relied upon either in physics, ethics, or theology. The particular fault to which I refer in their mode of reasoning, is, that they consider a difficulty which they are not able to solve, as sufficient to disprove a doctrine, supported by clear and conclusive evidence. In the science of the mind, as well as in natural philosophy, the legitimate object of research is, as the most approved writers have abundantly shown, to discover what is fact;

not to determine what is possible or consistent. What would be thought of me, should I regulate my inquiries in natural philosophy by the principle involved in the mode of reasoning referred to? I start with a full belief of the common doctrine of philosophy, that all material substances have the power of attraction constantly operating with regard to each other; and I am resolved to admit nothing, which seems to me incapable of being reconciled with this. If in the progress of my inquiries I should find any thing, which seems to me inconsistent with the grand principle of attraction, I am predetermined not receive it into my creed. By and by facts occur, which indicate that, in certain cases, material substances have the power of repulsion. But as I am unable to see how this power can consist with the other, I will not believe its existence. Or if I admit the existence of repulsion, I will no longer admit attraction. Am I now a disciple of Newton? Or has my understanding gone back to the thraldom of the school-men? Governing myself by the same maxim, I attempt to learn the properties of the magnet. I am not satisfied with the simple inquiry, what properties do in fact belong to it? What do experience and observation show? With this I must join another inquiry;-how can such properties be compatible with each other? And how can I admit two different things, when I am not able to see their consistency? Such philosophizing as this would lead to results, for which few men would be willing to be responsible.

But the falsity of the mode of reasoning, above described, is no less obvious, in relation to the doctrine of depravity. The proper inquiry is, what is taught by the word of God, and by the facts which fall under our observation? I ought to come to this inquiry with a

mind as free from prepossesion, as that with which a physician inquires, whether his patient exhibits the signs of a consumption. And if I find such proof that depravity naturally belongs to man, as satisfies me that any other properties of man are natural; I have come to the end of my inquiry. So far as my belief of the fact is concerned, I have nothing to do with the question, how this fact is consistent with the perfections of God, or with the moral agency of man, or with any thing else. I I say not this, however, because I have the least reluctance to consider the question of consistency, in its proper place; but to show that, in our reasoning, the consideration of this is to be made entirely distinct from the consideration of the evidence, which proves the fact. If I would be either a philosopher or a Christian, I must believe what is clearly proved to be fact, whether I am able to reconcile the fact with other things I believe, or not. Nor must I in any case suffer. my views of the clearness and competency of the proof, or my mode of coming to the discovery of it, to be influenced by any difficulty I may feel, as to the consistency of the fact to be proved with other facts. But I wish it to be remembered that I say all this, not because I suppose that two facts or truths, which are to be believed, may be really inconsistent with each other; but because, admitting that they are consistent, we may not in every case be under advantages to discover how they

are consistent.

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To come at a still clearer view of the error involved in that principle of reasoning, against which my jections have been aimed; suppose some philosopher should rise up and say, that my believing the power of repulsion to exist in matter is inconsistent with my believing the power of attraction; or should charge me with denying attraction, because I believe repulsion.

And suppose this pretended inconsistency of repulsion with attraction should be perpetually mentioned, or hinted at, as an argument proving conclusively, that matter can have no such property, as the power of repulsion. In reply to such sophistry I should say, first, that there is, in my view, no inconsistency at all between these two powers, and that, if any man affirms there is an inconsistency, the burden of proof certainly lies upon him. Secondly. A man's being unable to see the consistency of the two powers can be taken as no part of the proof of a real inconsistency. Thirdly. The question, whether there is such a thing as repulsion in matter, must depend entirely on its proper philosophical evidence, and must be discussed without any regard to the alleged inconsistency of repulsion with attraction. If repulsion is proved to exist by clear, conclusive evidence; I should be a child, and not a philosopher, to refuse it a place in my belief, because it is difficult to reconcile it with something else.

I entertain the same views of the proper mode of reasoning on the subject of man's natural depravity; and these views I exhibited in my fourth Letter, to which I beg leave particularly to refer the reader. After several remarks, intended to simplify the object of inquiry, I said; "These remarks are intended to show that according to the just principles of reasoning in such a case, we have nothing to do with the inquiry, whether the common doctrine of depravity can consist with the moral perfection of God, &c. If I say, this doctrine cannot be true, because I cannot reconcile it with the goodness of God; it is the same as saying, I am an infallible judge, and my opinion must stand, though opposed by the declarations of Scripture and the evidence of facts. To take such a position would be an effectual bar to convic