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have found sensation in man wholly explicable by material causes, or he should have not found it so in brutes. This was surely most arbitrary philosophy. If feeling in man involves thought, why should feeling in brutes involve only mechanism? Meantime, on the genuine principles on which he set out, and by which he distinguishes matter and mind, he should have argued that sensation as much inferred an immaterial substance, as thought, volition, conscience,

there being an equal dissimilarity between all these phenomena and the observed phenomena of matter. He should have concluded, on his principles, that, though the lower animals may not possess an immaterial principle of the same power, compass, or variety, as man, yet that it is certain there is something immaterial in them, if there be any such thing in man. Sensation, pleasure, pain, ought as satisfactorily to infer this as intelligence and thought; it being just as inconceivable that the former states are not states of mind as that the latter are not.

And even as regards intelligence, the reasonings of Descartes to show that animals are destitute of it are, to our minds, wholly unsatisfactory. His arguments only show what none not even a candid brute would ever feel disposed to doubt or dispute, that the mind of man is superior to that of brutes; though probably brutes themselves would hint that even this is to be received with many individual ex

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thought in brutes except this only; that since they have eyes, ears, tongues, and other organs like ours, it is very probable that they feel as we do ; and since in our mode of sensation, thought is included, thought must also be attributed to them: which reason, as it is very obvious, has taken possession of the minds of men from the earliest times. But there are many more reasons, and much more strong, which, though not so obvious, evince the contrary.' (Epist. lxvii. Part I.)

ceptions; and that, as compared with many bipeds, some highly respectable quadrupeds have an evident advantage. There may be an instrument of thought in them which, like a flute as compared with an organ, may differ in variety and compass from our own, and yet be equally immaterial; the degree of its variety and compass, in every case, varying with the place of each class of animals in the universal system; exquisitely adapted to that material conformation which each possesses, and accurately limited by it. The analogies and differences between the material organisation of brutes and that of man,-exactly adjusted to the sphere of each species of animals, would seem to point to corresponding analogies and differences in relation to the sentient and intelligent principle; and if, therefore, man has an immaterial principle superadded to his material organism, so, in all probability, have the lower animals. Analogy would certainly lead us to suspect that, as is a dog's paw to a man's hand, so, probably, is the agent which uses the one to the agent which uses the other; and that, as both the instruments, exquisitely formed for their respective purposes, are material, so the agents, as admirably constructed for their respective purposes, are equally immaterial, if either be so.

The arguments on which Descartes chiefly insists,namely, those derived from the absence in brutes of the conventional signs by which men communicate their thoughts,-are either beside the mark, or involve a petitio principii, or are adduced in utter forgetfulness of those very differences, (and the limitations they suggest,) of which we have just spoken. He says we never find animals, whatever their improvement, framing general signs; that any language they have, only serves to express sensation, appetite, and passion.

Now, not to insist again that these would seem just as much properties of mind as thought itself, it may be remarked- - first, that it is gratuitous to say that the signs are thus limited; that we know not in what way or to what extent brutes communicate with each other; that numberless phenomena would go to show that in all probability they do communicate to a much greater extent than we are aware of; and that signs, of whatever nature, are as much a language as our own, though they may not be so perfect a language. When Balaam's ass reproved the capricious temper of his master, did he do it more eloquently than the speaking silence of many an ill-treated brute rebukes the wanton cruelty of his tyrant master? But, secondly, we remark that, to say that animals do not use our signs, and exhibit a capacity of reasoning as we reason, is entirely to forget the analogies of which we have above spoken, and to demand a species of proof for which it is absurd to ask. We may say to Descartes as Gassendi says to him:- Mais voyez, je vous prie, si vous êtes assez équitable d'exiger d'une bête des paroles d'un homme et cependant de ne prendre pas garde à celles qui leur sont propres.' As to the signs animals use, we have long felt that it is mere presumption in us to affirm that they are so very limited as men are apt to suppose; and that if we could construct a grammar and dictionary of monkeylanguage or bee-language, we might perhaps, find it a much more wonderful and artificial instrument, and of far greater compass and copiousness, than we, with our superiority, are disposed to admit. That it would not be like our language may be safely affirmed from the very limitations already referred to.

Some will tell us that instinct accounts for all the phenomena in question; but then, without an imma

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terial principle, what will account for instinct? 'Well; but the uniformity of the phenomena of instinct.' Yes, and the uniformity of many of the phenomena in man; of his sensations, his appetites, his actions, his reasonings. If we could find a satisfactory solution of the one in a mechanical and automatic origin, we might, perhaps, find it of the other. The instincts by which bees build their cells would hardly be more incomprehensible displays of automatic power to a being who had no other knowledge of man than we possess of brutes, who lived wholly outside us,— than would seem to such a being the housebuilding and the cooking tendencies of man. And if it be said, 'Not so; for whatever general uniformity in the latter case, there is far greater variety than in the former;' he would, perhaps, whimsically account for it by our instincts being more imperfectly and less equably distributed than theirs! He would, perhaps, say, that ' though all bees are good builders, many men are but wretched bunglers in the art.'-It is granted, however, that there is far more variety in the actions of men than in those of any other species of animals; but then we might expect, from the very different structure of his body, corresponding differences in the structure of his mind; we should anticipate from those differences just what we see, not a violation of all analogy. But this is not all that can be said. There is a variety—undeniable though, as might be expected, more limited-in the actions of brutes. Here the argument from the uniformity of instincts breaks down; for, though there are not so many variations or so wide a deviation from uniform law in the lower animals as in man, there is a variation; there are innumerable authentic examples of adaptation, of adjustment of specific means to ends, of

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special modifications of instinctive action to suit emergencies; just such as more limited powers and capacities than those of man, but of the same nature, might be expected to display. In a word, if the phenomena of human thought are quite incompatible with man's being all matter, those of brute thought seem to involve a similar conclusion; nor can we, satisfactorily argue for the first without admitting the last. We must maintain or abandon both at the

same time.

It is well that lions cannot turn painters;' for animals might retort against us many of the arguments which we employ against them. What work they would make with our long ages of barbarism and ignorance! our egregiously imperfect first efforts, as compared with theirs! our protracted infancy, both in individuals and nations! And then what disastrous arguments might be drawn from our moral infirmities! We almost fear that the last would supply them with stronger arguments against our possession of a reasonable nature (whether material or immaterial), or at least, in proof of that reasonable nature being very inferior to their instinct, than our intellectual superiority would serve to confute.

The reason, and a very insufficient reason it is (as Dugald Stewart has remarked), for which Descartes thought himself bound to deny an immaterial principle in brutes, was, that if he admitted it, he must also admit their immortality! This he says in reply to Henry More, who, in his lively expostulation with Descartes on this subject, holds a brief for the silent brutes. In the letter from which we have already quoted he gives, 'among the many and strong reasons' for his opinion, that it seems not so probable thatworms and fleas should be endowed with im

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