ting soil, and practices husbandry, and is satisfied if in eight months they arrive at perfection? Phædr. Yes, Socrates, that will be his way when he is in earnest; he will do the other, as you say, only as an amuse ment. Soc. And can we suppose that he who knows the just and good and honorable has less understanding in reference to his own seeds than the husbandman? Phædr. Certainly not. Soc. Then he will not seriously incline to write them in water with pen and ink, or in dumb characters which have not a word to say for themselves and cannot adequately express the truth? Phadr. No, that is not likely. Soc. No, that is not likely, in the garden of letters he will plant them only as an amusement, or he will write them down as memorials against the forgetfulness of old age, to be treasured by him and his equals when they, like him, have one foot in the grave; and he will rejoice in beholding their tender growth; and they will be his pastime while others are watering the garden of their souls with banqueting and the like. Phædr. A pastime, Socrates, as noble as the other is ignoble, when a man is able to pass time merrily in the representation of justice and the like. Soc. True, Phædrus. But nobler far is the serious pursuit of the dialectician, who finds a congenial soul, and then with knowledge engrafts and sows words which are able to help themselves and him who planted them, and are not un277 fruitful, but have in them seeds which may bear fruit in other natures, nurtured in other ways,-making the seed everlasting and the possessors happy to the utmost extent of human happiness. Phædr. Yes, indeed, that is far nobler. Soc. And now, Phaedrus, having agreed upon the premises we may decide about the conclusion. Phædr. About what conclusion? Soc. About Lysias, whom we censured, and his art of writing, and his discourses, and the rhetorical skill or want of skill which was shown in them; for he brought us to this point. And I think that we are now pretty well informed about the nature of art and its opposite. Phadr. Yes, I think with you; but I wish that you would repeat what was said. Soc. Until a man knows the truth of the several particulars of which he is writing or speaking, and is able to define them as they are, and having defined them again to divide them until they can be no longer divided, and until in like manner he is able to discern the nature of the soul and discover the different modes of discourse which are adapted to different natures, and to arrange and dispose them in such a way that the simple form of speech may be addressed to the simpler nature, and the complex and composite to the complex nature -until he has accomplished all this, he will be unable to handle arguments according to rules of art, as far as their nature allows them to be subjected to art, either for the purpose of teaching or persuading; that is the view which is implied in the whole preceding argument. Phædr. Yes, that was our view, certainly. Soc. Secondly, as to the justice of the censure which was passed on speaking or writing discourses-did not our previous argument show Phædr. Show what? Soc. That whether Lysias or any other writer that ever was or will be, whether private man or statesman, writes a political treatise in his capacity of legislator, and fancies that there is a great certainty and clearness in his performance, the fact of his writing as he does is only a disgrace to him, whatever men may say. For entire ignorance about the nature of justice and injustice, and good and evil, and the inability to distinguish the dream from the reality, cannot in truth be otherwise than disgraceful to him, even though he have the applause of the whole world. Phædr. Certainly. 278 Soc. But he who thinks that in the written word there is necessarily much which is not serious, and that neither poetry nor prose, spoken or written, are of any great value-if, like the compositions of the rhapsodes, they are only recited in order to be believed, and not with any view to criticism or instruction; and who thinks that even the best of them are but a reminiscence of what we know, and that only in principles of justice and goodness and nobility taught and communicated orally and written in the soul, which is the true way of writing, is there clearness and perfection and seriousness; and that such principles are like legitimate offspring; being, in the first place, that which the man finds in his own bosom; secondly, the brethren and descendants and relations of this which has been duly implanted in the souls of others; and who cares for them and no others this is the right sort of man; and you and I, Phædrus, would pray that we may become like him. 62 A class of wandering minstrels, who earned their living by reciting the poems of Homer and other epics. Phædr. That is most assuredly my desire and prayer. Soc. And now the play is played out; and of rhetoric enough. Go and tell Lysias that to the fountain and school of the Nymphs we went down, and were bidden by them to convey a message to him and to other composers of speeches -to Homer and other writers of poems, whether set to music or not. And to Solon63 and the writers of political documents, which they term laws, we are to say that if their compositions are based on knowledge of the truth, and they can defend or prove them, when they are put to the test, by spoken arguments, which leave their writings poor in comparison of them, then they are not only poets, orators, legislators, but worthy of a higher name. Phædr. What name is that? Soc. Wise, I may not call them; for that is a great name which belongs to God only, -lovers of wisdom or philosophers is their modest and befitting title. Phædr. Very good. Soc. And he who cannot rise above his own compilations and compositions, which he has been long patching and piecing, adding some and taking away some, may be justly called poet or speech-maker or law-maker. Phadr. Certainly. Soc. Now go and tell this to your companion. Phædr. But there is also a friend of yours who ought not to be forgotten. Soc. Who is that? Phadr. Isocrates 64 the fair. 63 Solon (638-558 B.C.): a celebrated Athenian statesman and law-giver. 64 Isocrates (i-sők'ra-tēz, 436-338 B.C.): a Greek orator and teacher of rhetoric. He came under the influence of Socrates, but never belonged to the circle of his most intimate friends and disciples. Soc. What of him? Phædr. What message shall we send to him? willing to risk a prophecy concerning him. 279 Soc. I think that he has a genius which soars above the orations of Lysias, and he has a character of a finer mould. My impression of him is that he will marvelously improve as he grows older, and that all former rhetoricians will be as children in comparison of him. And I believe that he will not be satisfied with this, but that some divine impulse will lead him to things higher still. For there is an element of philosophy in his nature. This is the message which comes from the gods dwelling in this place, and which I will myself deliver to Isocrates, who is my delight; and do you give the other to Lysias, who is yours. Phædr. I will; and now as the heat is abated let us depart. Soc. Should we not offer up a prayer first of all to the local deities? Phædr. By all means. Soc. Beloved Pan, 65 and all ye other gods who haunt this place, give me beauty in the inward soul; and may the outward and inward man be at one. May I reckon the wise to be the wealthy, and may I have such a quantity of gold as none but the temperate can carry. Anything more? That prayer, I think, is enough for me. Phadr. Ask the same for me, for friends should have all things in common. Soc. Let us go. 65 Pan: god of woods and fields, of flocks and shepherds; he dwelt in caves or forests, and wandered over mountains and valleys. 12 |