What was that? We spoke, if I am not mistaken, of a perfect way, which was longer and more circuitous, at the end of which they were to appear in full view; this however, as we said, need not prevent our offering an exposition of a popular sort, in character like what had preceded. And you replied that such an exposition would be enough for you, and so the inquiry was continued in what appeared to me to be a very imperfect manner; but whether you were satisfied or not is for you to say. Yes, he said, I thought and the others thought that you gave us a fair measure of truth. But, my friend, I said, a measure of such things which in any degree falls short of the truth is not fair measure; for nothing imperfect is the measure of anything, although persons are too apt to be contented and think that they need search no further. Yes, that is not uncommon when people are indolent. Yes, I said; and there cannot be any worse fault in the guardian of a State and the laws. True. The guardian then, I said, must be required to take the longer route, and toil at learning as well as at gymnastics, or he will never reach the height of that knowledge which is his proper calling. What, he said, is there a knowledge still higher than these -higher than justice and the other virtues? Yes, I said, there is. And of these too we must behold not the outline merely, as at present-nothing short of the most perfect representation should satisfy us. When little things are elaborated with an infinity of pains, in order that they may appear in full clearness and precision, how ridiculous that the highest truths should not be held worthy of the greatest exactness! Yes, said he, and that is a right noble thought; but do you suppose that we shall refrain from asking you which are the highest ? 505 Nay, I said, ask if you will; but I am certain that you have often heard the answer, and now you either do not understand or you are disposed to be troublesome; I incline to think the latter, for you have been often told that the idea of good is the highest knowledge, and that all other things become useful and advantageous only by their use of this. And you must be quite aware that of this I am about to speak, concerning which, as I shall say, we know so little; and, wanting which, any other knowledge or possession of any kind will profit us nothing. Do you think that the possession of the whole world is of any value without the good? or of all wisdom, without the beautiful and good? 16 No, indeed, he said. You are doubtless aware that most people call pleasure good, and the finer sort of wits say wisdom? And you are aware that the latter cannot explain the nature of wisdom, but are obliged after all to say that wisdom is of the good? That is very ridiculous, he said. Yes, I said, that they should begin by reproaching us with our ignorance, and then presume our knowledge of good-for wisdom, as they say, is of the good, which implies that we understand them when they use the term "good"-is certainly ridiculous. Most true, he said. And those who make pleasure their good are in equal perplexity; for they are compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures as well as good. Certainly. And therefore to acknowledge that bad and good are the same? True. There can be no doubt about the numerous difficulties in which this question is involved. There can be none. Well, and is not this an obvious fact, that many are willing to possess, or to do, or to wear the appearance of the just and honorable without the reality; but no one is satisfied to possess the appearance of good-the reality is what they seek; the appearance in the case of the good is despised by every one. Very true, he said. This, then, which every man pursues and makes his end, having a presentiment that there is such an end, and yet hesitating because neither knowing the nature nor having the same 16 What is a man profited if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul."-Matthew xvi. 26. sure proof of this as of other things, and therefore having no profit in other things,—is this, I would ask, a principle about which those who are called the best men in the State, 506 and to whom everything is to be entrusted, ought to be in such darkness? Certainly not, he said. I am sure, I said, that he who does not know how the beautiful and the just are likewise good will not be worth much as a guardian of them and I suspect that no one will have a true knowledge of them without this knowledge. That, he said, is a shrewd suspicion of yours. And if we only have a guardian who has this knowledge our State will be perfectly ordered? Of course, he replied; but I wish you would tell me whether you conceive this supreme principle of the good to be knowledge or pleasure, or different from either? Aye, I said, I knew quite well that a fine gentleman like you would not be contented with the thoughts of other men. True, Socrates; and I must say that you have no right to be always repeating the opinions of others, and never to tell your own, and this after having passed a lifetime in the study of philosophy. Well, but has any one a right to say, positively, what he does not know? Not, he said, with the positiveness of knowledge; he has no right to do that: but he ought to say what he thinks, as a matter of opinion. But do you not know, I said, that opinions are bad all, and the best of them blind? You would not deny that those who have any true notion without intelligence are only like blind men finding their way along a straight road? Very true. And do you wish to behold what is blind and crooked and base, when brightness and beauty are within your reach? Still, I must implore you, Socrates, said Glaucon, not to turn away just as you are reaching the goal; if you will only give such an explanation of the good as you have already given about justice and temperance and the other virtues, that will satisfy us. Yes, my friend, I said, and that will satisfy me too, extremely well, but I cannot help fearing that I shall fail, and that in my zeal I shall make a fool of myself. No, sweet sirs, let us not at present ask what is the actual nature of the good, for to reach what is in my thoughts now is too much for me in my present mood. But of the child of the good who is likest him, I would fain speak, if I could be sure that you wished to hear -otherwise, not. Nay, he said, speak; the child shall be the interest, and you shall remain in our debt for an account of the parent or principal. I do indeed wish, I replied, that I could pay, and you receive, the parent or principal account, and not, as now, the interest or child only; take, however, the child, which 507is the interest, and at the same time have a care that I 511 do not render a false account, although I have no intention of deceiving you. Yes, we will take all the care that we can proceed. Yes, I said, but I must first come to an understanding with you, and remind you of what I have mentioned in the course of this discussion, and at many other times. What is that? he said. The old story, that there is a many beautiful and a many good, and so of other things which we describe and define; to all of them the term "many" is applied. True, he said. And there is an absolute beauty and an absolute good, and so of other things to which the term "many" is applied; they may be brought under a single idea, which is called the essence of each. That is true. The many, as we say, are seen but not known, and the ideas are known but not seen. [There is an analogy between material vision and intellectual vision. The material sun generates and nourishes the things in the world which we see, and also gives us light by which to see them. In like manner the good is the true creator of the essence of things and also the author of all knowledge of the essence of things. It may be said that material vision gives two degrees of imperfect knowledge or opinion, the more imperfect being the perception of shadows, and the less imperfect being the perception of material objects; also that intel |