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an answer; and it is so hearty that one may be certain that if a few more such Hodges were found in the pulpits and pews of so-called Calvinistic Churches, we should soon hear of fellowship meetings and love-feasts. The confession is followed by a
POPULAR DEFINITION OF CALVINISM.
'Our theology in its elements is very simple. It may be comprehended in a single sentence :
"I am a poor sinner and nothing at all, And Jesus Christ is my all-in-all."
'I, of course, rejoice to know that this sentence presents the experience of Wesleyans as well as Calvinists. But the peculiar character of Calvinism is simply that it emphasizes to the uttermost the absolute nothingness of the believing sinner, and the absolute all-in-allness of the blessed Christ.'
Dr. Hodge followed this somewhat ad captandum statement by a historical review of the rise and development of the various doctrines related to the controversy, with less show of erudition than Dr. Curry, but yet in a manner masterly and complete. It will be enough for me to give in his own words the summary of deductions with which the sketch closed.
'Pelagianism and semi-Pelagianism mark two heresies condemned by the whole Church, and in experience found to be inconsistent with living, spiritual religion.
Augustinianism is used in a more general and in a more strict and specific sense. In its more general sense it comprehends the doctrines of grace common to all Christian Churches not utterly dead, comprehending all that is living in the Church of Rome, and especially all evangelical Christendom. In its more specific sense it is equivalent to Calvinism.
Calvinism is the doctrine of the Reformed Churches as above defined, and is that form of evangelical religion which conforms most nearly to the type of Augustine and Calvin.
'Arminianism is the title of the rationalizing tendency, which gradually laid aside evangelical characteristics in the schools of Limborch and Grotius and Laud.
• Wesleyanism, as represented by Richard Watson, is a thoroughly evangelical system, magnifying the grace of God, the guilt and helplessness of man.'
The rest of the Lecture was taken up by an effort to show the points in which Wesleyanism and Calvinism agree, and those in which they differ. And here it is not safe to trust to paraphrase or synopsis, lest I should misrepresent the utterances of the speaker.
POINTS OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN WESLEYANS AND CALVINISTS.
'Both systems admit and emphasize : 1st. The absolute sovereignty of God as Creator, Providential Ruler and Redeemer. Both hold that salvation is entirely of grace and by grace, both mean (1) that which is absolutely undeserved, gratuitous; (2) that which is effected by the direct power of the Lord's Spirit superadded to all His natural endow. ments.
'2nd. Both hold that man is a free agent; that his responsible moral action is selforiginated and self-directed. There is doubtless a tendency on either hand to magnify the one of these principles at the
expense of the other.'
POINTS OF DIFFERENCE AND CONTRAST.
I. The great theological difference. Calvinists hold, and Wesleyans deny, that God from eternity foreordained whatsoever comes to pass.
1st. Observe that it is not involved here that God approves the things decreed in any degree, not that His decree legal izes them, or gives them a right to be. It is simply affirmed that God has determined that they shall be.
2nd. Observe that it is not meant that God by His decree causes things to be, or that His decree in any manner whatsoever interferes with the natural relation of events, the dependence of effects upon their natural causes, the suspension of contingencies upon their conditions, or the spontaneous self-decision of free agents.
3rd. Observe that Wesleyans agree that God did eternally foreordain all actions of necessary agents and laws, and they object only to the application of the principle to the free acts of free agents.
As to the essential nature of free agency there are three classes of theories possible.
1st. Those which virtually deny freedom; making the will subject to the law
sion of a man to yield to grace and accept Christ is an effect of a special grace which he experienced, called Regenerating grace.'
Thus Dr. Hodge makes the distinction between ourselves and the Calvinists to look very small indeed; but whether the Calvinism of the Principal of Princeton is that of Calvin, Owen and Dr. Thomas Goodwin, I will leave to the decision of better theologians than myself. I will not presume to decide which of the two combatants was victor in this duel of theologues; both handled their weapons skilfully; each punctured the other without doing serious damage, and honour was satisfied.
THE WARBURTON LECTURES FOR 1876-1880; * OR, MODERN CRITICISM AND THE ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY :
BY THE REV. J. ROBINSON GREGORY.
'ADVANCED liberal criticism' claims to have destroyed the evidential value of prophecy. It boasts that the 'argument from prophecy' is a thing of the past, a fit study, possibly, for the theological tyro, but now altogether unworthy of the attention of the learned, except as they may stoop to the needless task of once again exposing its futility. The process by which this long-trusted buttress of the Christian faith has been undermined is extremely simple; but an incalculable wealth of ingenuity, scholarship, research and labour has been spent in its application. It is the supernatural character of prophecy that constitutes its argumentative value; at least, if it be deprived of the supernatural, it ceases to be part of the evidences of Christianity.
If, therefore, it can be shown that prophecy was a purely natural phenomenon, the victory is won. the predictive element in prophecy stamps it as supernatural; hence it behoves the gainsayer to cause prediction to vanish from prophecy; that is to say, it must be demonstrated that the Hebrew Prophets foretold nothing on higher authority than their own. It may be allowed that they made some happy hits, that some of their guesses were clever to a degree; that, indeed, they were farsighted, keen-witted speculators and calculators; but it must be most positively denied that any of their prognostications were beyond the ability of unaided mortal intelligence. To the uninitiated this may seem an absolutely hopeless task; but to the Old Testament Prophecy: Its Witness as a Record of Divine Foreknowledge. The Warburton Lectures for 1876-1880. With Notes on the Genuineness of the Book of Daniel and the Prophecy of the Seventy Weeks. By the Rev. Stanley Leathes, D.D., Rector of Cliffe-at-Hoo, Prebendary of St. Paul's Cathedral, Professor of Hebrew, King's College, London. London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1880.
modern scientific criticism nothing is impossible, if only a few innocent postulates be granted it. Indeed, the demands may be reduced to one -viz., that the subjectivity of the critic be the ultimate standard of appeal.
Be it observed that the wary critic does not protrude unnecessarily this his fundamental postulate; it excites our admiration to see how cleverly he covers it with parade of impartiality; how dexterously he conceals it from himself, probably, no less than from his readers-under well-turned phraseology and not too comprehensible verbiage; how skilfully he ornaments it with learning; how cunningly he avails himself of every advantage the acknowledged difficulties of the prophecies and their symbolical and poetic language give him; with what dogged pertinacity and subtle scent he hunts for minute errors which may ill consort with the claims of inspiration; how triumphantly he flings in the faces of believers yet unfulfilled prophecies, as though the world had already come to an end; with what ineffable scorn or patronizing pity he rejects all spiritualizing' interpretations; and with what heroic constancy he shuts his eyes to facts which are patent to every one but him. Or, perhaps, he reaches his goal by a shorter but even more unsafe route.
sumes as axiomatic that every record that relates aught supernatural is, ipso facto, untrustworthy. Of course this begs the whole question and compels him to reason in a palpably vicious circle; but he is equally apt in detecting logical fallacies in others and constructing them for himself. The Book of Daniel, for example, could not, he says, have been written earlier than B.C. 165, because it contains so-called predictions of events that occurred close
to that date; but because the Book of Daniel was not written till B.C. 165, its so-called predictions were post eventum. The circle is drawn with a much longer radius than we have used here, but it is no less a circle for that, and has the same centre. Or, again, let it be granted that all that is 'unscientific' is untrue, and the rest can be easily proved. For of two methods of accounting for the same facts, science' obliges you to prefer that which eliminates the supernatural, even though you thus forsake the better for the worse reason; and, above all, it is eminently 'unscientific' to accept any light which history subsequent to the prophecy may throw upon it: 'science* always gropes in the twilight of the times when words were spoken; otherwise the problem is too simple for it to condescend to solve. further, it is, if possible, more outrageously unscientific' to recognize
what, after all, has just a scintilla of evidence in its favour-the reality of experimental religion, and that men even nowadays do hold communion with God.
Suppose, then, that we may multiply indefinitely the number of the Prophets whose writings have come down to us, so that we may have two Isaiahs, two or three Zechariahs, at least two Daniels, and so on; that we may give them a much more recent date than is commonly assigned them, and than they ask for themselves; that we agree that they understood their utterances in senses different from those which orthodox believers perceive in them; that weadmit that many of their prophecies are dubious, and many unaccomplished; and that modern criticism has revolutionized our ideas about their works, so that their alleged right to the deference due to inspiration is waived and no spiritual significance in
Of course, science' in this use of it means critical, not physical, science.
their words deemed admissible: what then? The predictive element in prophecy vanishes, says modern advanced criticism. Nevertheless, a substantial residuum is left, which cannot but raise doubt as to the validity of the destructive process, if it does not manifest, as we think it does, its total failure.
The evidence from prophecy possesses a signal advantage over that from miracles, because the former is its own witness, while the latter requires confirmatory testimony. Before we can use a given miracle to attest a revelation, we must be satisfied as to the trustworthiness of the record that contains it; and if some sceptic affirms that no amount of testimony can overbear the antecedent improbability that a miracle should be wrought, we can find no direct answer to him; we cannot prove to him that the alleged miracle actually did take place, apart from the history which he refuses to receive as authentic. We can expose the folly of his position, we can turn it by a flank movement; but until he credits the narrative, reasoning based upon the miracle can have no force to him. But no such preliminary enquiry forbids the immediate employment of the evidence of prophecy. Here is an utterance of a certain (or uncertain) date: undoubtedly it bears the form of a prediction. There is an event which undoubtedly answers it: utterance and event are as like to one another as the magnified photograph of an impression is to the seal which originally made it. We will forego all enquiry as to how the prophecy came into existence; we will refrain studiously from calling it a prediction; if you please, we will not even denominate it a prophecy. It is sufficient for our purpose that it does exist, and, confessedly, did exist, long-it is immaterial exactly how long-before the event to which it bears so strong
And we will scrupulously avoid connecting with the event the term fulfilment. We will regard it purely as matter of history, which confessedly did happen. Now compare event and utterance; you have accounted, let us say, for the event, you have accounted for the utterance, separately: now account for the resemblance between them.
To this most reasonable demand, 'advanced liberal criticism' does not vouchsafe the vestige of a reply. It strives to lessen the resemblance, which nevertheless it can only very partially, if at all, obliterate, and which it dares not boldly contradict. Yet it would be an insult to our common sense to assert that the resemblance does not need to be explained; it is clearly the essential feature in the problem. Of such correspondence between prophecy and history, scores of instances might be adduced. And in this aspect of it the evidence of prophecy increases, not by arithmetical, but by geometrical progression; the gainsayer must account not merely for resemblances and coincidences, but also for the convergence of coincidences. The connection between prophecy and history, it will be answered, exists solely in the mind of the observer; it is intellectual, not substantial. Be it so : then what is it in prophecy and history which causes us to connect them? It is marvellous to find men who pride themselves upon their intellectual acumen ignoring one of the most patent laws of thought. The human mind imperatively requires that the nexus, which it itself forms between two facts, shall be explained as well as the bare facts themselves, or it will not admit the explanation to be a sufficient, much less a satisfactory one. That nexus is as truly a fact, though of a different order, as those which it joins. When the denier of prophecy has shown how the prophet came to speak the words
and how the event came to pass, he has yet to explain the connection the mind instinctively forms between them, or he has failed in his task. The intellect persists in its belief that it perceives the connection because it is there, until it is convinced of the falsity of its involuntary inference.
This may be stigmatized as a very rough and ready method of treating so pretentious and portentous a phenomenon as advanced liberal criticism'; and it does not aspire to be more. Nevertheless, the crux of the dispute lies in the connection, real or apparent, between utterance and event. Any theory, however plausible else, which cannot account for that, thereby pronounces its own condemnation. It is obvious, too, that the line of reasoning we have just indicated is quite independent of the psychological difficulty that no revelation from God can be convincing except to the one who originally receives it; for the source of the prophecy, so far as our present argument is concerned, is a matter of indifference.
No abler or more thorough-going champion of the historico-critical interpretation' has appeared than Professor Kuenen. To his volume* it is chiefly due that the subject of prophecy is just now exciting so much discussion in the theological world. A formal reply to his massive and learned volume has not, we believe, been attempted; but almost every recent writer on prophecy has referred to it, and discussed its theory to a greater or less extent, and many writers in various periodicals have reviewed the whole or selected portions of it. We trust an exhaustive examination of it may yet appear by some competent hand, not entirely
for its own sake, but because the foes of the faith may boast of it as unanswerable, and timorous friends may ascribe too great importance to their challenge. Though written ir Dutch, it was undertaken at the re quest of a Scotchman, Dr. Muir, and specially addresses itself to the British public. It endeavours 'tc demonstrate satisfactorily the insuf ficiency of the grounds on which the supernatural character of prophecy has been assumed, and to justify the conclusion that the phenomena can be accounted for-without resort to the supposition of any miraculous intervention - by the genius and peculiar religious character of the Hebrews, as developed by their his tory and fortunes, and acted upon by the circumstances of the times in which the prophets lived.' (P. xi) Even this sentence, which describes the scope of the book, suggests its weakness, the peculiar religious character of the Hebrews' was developed by their history and fortunes;' but had itself no originating cause!
The most recent of the works which Professor Kuenen's volume has evoked is by Professor Stanley Leathes, who has previously pub lished two books dealing with the subject of prophecy; the first being entirely devoted to it, and the second in great part-the Boyle Lectures for 1863, and the Bampton Lectures for 1874. He declares: 'It would ill become any one to handle the subject of prophecy who has not patiently and conscientiously weighed his [Kuenen's] theory.' He has not attempted to traverse the whole of Kuenen's long argument'; he has only dealt with that argument in detail in places where it contravened' his 'own'; but the
An Historical and Critical Enquiry. University of Leyden. Translated With an Introduction by J. Muir,
The Prophets and Prophecy in Israel. By Dr. A. Kuenen, Professor of Theology in the from the Dutch by the Rev. Adam Milroy, M. A. Esq., D.C.L. London: Longmans, Green and Co.