The Imagination in Spinoza and Hume: A Comparative Study in the Light of Some Recent Contributions to PsychologyUniversity of Chicago Press, 1902 - 77 sider |
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abstrac according activity adjustment analysis anticipating appropriate stimuli arise assumption attain attempt become body carbon paper causation and substance cause and effect character co-ordination concept conflict connection consciousness constant conjunction continued and independent corresponding creative custom difficulties discussion distinction doctrine dualism element emotions ence Ethics excommunication existence experience external eye-hand faculty finite force and vivacity function given habit Hume's theory hypothesis idea of causation imagination and reason impression individual instances Intell interruption involved justment knowledge logical means ment mental imagery metaphysical mind motor never object organic original particular passions passive perceptions philosophy possible present problem prophecy prophet psycho psychological quod recombining reconstruction reference reflex arc regard the imagination relation revealed Ribot sensation sense-perceptions specious present Spinoza and Hume Spinoza's theory statement stream of consciousness subtle bodies Teleology theology things tion Trac Tractatus Theologico-Politicus true idea truth understanding unity vidual words
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Side 46 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Side 61 - I shall not at present meddle, with the physical consideration of the mind, or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits, or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings ; and whether those ideas do, in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or not.
Side 36 - Tis this latter principle which peoples the world, and brings us acquainted with such existences, as by their removal in time and place, lie beyond the reach of the senses and memory.
Side 9 - ... that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else; whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous,...
Side 43 - The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression conveyed by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be derived from some internal impression, or impression of reflection. There is no internal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This therefore is the essence of necessity. Upon the whole, necessity is something, that exists...
Side 37 - According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom, and custom has no influence, but by enlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of any object. It may therefore be concluded, that our judgment and imagination can never be contrary, and that custom cannot operate on the latter faculty after such a manner, as to render it opposite to the former. This difficulty we can remove after no other manner, than by supposing the influence of general rules.
Side 41 - From the mere repetition of any past impression, even to infinity, there never will arise any new original idea, such as that of a necessary connexion; and the number of impressions has in this case no more effect than if we confined ourselves to one only.
Side 42 - If reason determined us it would proceed upon that principle, that instances of which we have had no experience must resemble those of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same.
Side 34 - Since therefore the memory is known neither by the order of its complex ideas nor the nature of its simple ones, it follows that the difference betwixt it and the imagination lies in its superior force and vivacity. A man may indulge his fancy in feigning any past scene of adventures, nor would there be any possibility of distinguishing this from a remembrance of a like kind, were not the ideas of the imagination fainter and more obscure.
Side 44 - The efficacy or energy of causes is neither placed in the causes themselves, nor in the deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances.