other topics would doubtless have served the purpose as well, if not better. The method employed-that of presenting contrasting theories for mutual criticism is purely subordinate to the end in view, and is rather an after-thought than an essential condition, since it occurred to the writer only after Part I, which deals with Spinoza's theory of the imagination, had taken what is practically its present form.

PART I.

A STATEMENT OF SPINOZA'S THEORY OF THE IMAGINATION.

SPINOZA'S identification of the imagination with the source of all falsehood, error, and confusion—a doctrine which runs in varying forms through nearly all of his works, and which is so fully and consistently worked out, taking it as a whole, that it may fairly be called a theory of the imagination-is not to be intelligently stated or appreciated, it almost goes without saying, apart from the main body of his philosophy. What was the need, the problem, that this doctrine arose to meet? What did it contribute toward the attainment of the end proposed as a solution? In what respects, if any, does it appear inconsistent, or inadequate? and why? These questions openly confess to the assumptions that Spinoza was conscious of a problem, did propose a certain end as a solution, and developed a theory of the imagination as one of the means—not necessarily the only one-of attaining the end. It is believed, however, that these assumptions rest on Spinoza's own statements, especially on those in the autobiographical portion of that propedeutic to his philosophy, the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione.

SEC. I. THE NATURE OF SPINOZA'S PROBLEM.

Experience, we are told in the Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, had taught Spinoza that the commonly accepted goods of life are vain and futile; that the all-absorbing ideals commonly conceived to constitute the summum bonum — riches, fame, and the pleasures of sense when realized are found to be uncertain and fleeting, followed by melancholy and a dulled intellect in the case of the pleasures of sense, and by perpetual dissatisfaction with successive attainment in the case of fame and riches.

The same problem is suggested elsewhere in Spinoza's writings. In that earliest of his writings-the Dialogue between Understanding, Love, Reason, and Desire, composed probably four or five years prior to his excommunication - there is a trace of the same kind of dissatisfaction. At the beginning of the dialogue Love questions the Understanding regarding the nature and existence of an absolutely perfect being; Understanding answers that such a being and the whole of

nature are one, and Reason is called upon to corroborate this intuitive assertion. Then Desire breaks in with an attempt to point out contradictions in the answers that Understanding and Reason have given; and advises Love to remain content with the things that he, Desire, has shown to her. Love turns on Desire with these bitter words:

You shameless wretch! What things have you shown to me, save those from which would follow my ruin? For if I had ever allied myself to the things which you have shown me, from that hour I should have been pursued by the two arch-fiends of the human race-Hatred and Remorse—and now and then by Forgetfulness. Therefore I turn again to Reason. May he continue, and stop the mouths of those fiends. (Sigwart, German transl.,

p. 26.)

The same note is struck in the second part of the Brevis Tractatus de Deo, Homine et Beatudine, Chap. V, where we are told that we become weak and miserable through love of transient things. To be sure, there is a still harder fate possible for us; for Spinoza concludes this paragraph by saying:

If those who love transient things, which have some degree of reality, are so miserable, how is it possible to conceive the misery of those who love fame, riches, and the pleasures of sense, which have no reality at all!

The essentially objective reference of the dissatisfaction is the important thing to note. Spinoza's pessimism is far from the pessimism of Schopenhauer. It is not a despair born of a sense of the all-devouring, yet perpetually hungry, character of the will itself. It is not a pessimism with reference to the nature of desire itself, but it is a pessimism, or if that is too strong a word- -a deep-seated dissatisfaction, with reference to the ordinary objects of desire.

All the objects pursued by the multitude not only bring no remedy that tends to preserve our being, but even act as hindrances, causing the death not seldom of those who possess them, and always of those who are possessed by them.'

After mentioning examples of this fatal tendency, Spinoza concludes that:

All these evils seem to have arisen from the fact that happiness or unhappiness is made wholly to depend on the quality of the object which we love. When a thing is not loved, no quarrels will arise concerning it-no sadness will be felt if it perishes-no envy if it is possessed by another-no fear, no hatred;

I "Illa autem omnia, quae vulgus sequitur, non tantum nullum conferunt remedium ad nostrum esse conservandum, sed etiam id impediunt, et frequenter sunt causa interitus eorum, qui ea possident, et semper causa interitus eorum, qui ab iis possidentur." (Trac. de Intell. Em., p. 4.)

in short, no disturbances of the mind. All these arise from the love of what is perishable, such as the objects already mentioned.'

Let these brief statements, insignificant though they may appear in comparison with the great systematic developments of his thought, be given their due weight, and they will be found to afford some idea, it is believed, of Spinoza's fundamental problem, which was an ethical problem, perhaps the ethical problem, the problem as to the nature of the good. Scarcely more than the origin of this problem has been touched upon, its origin in the feeling of intense dissatisfaction with the fleeting and perishable objects, the barren ideals, which are pursued by the multitude, with the so-called goods of this life-riches, honor, and pleasure with "the worldly hope men set their hearts upon," which

'Like snow upon the desert's dusty face,

Lighting a little hour or two-is gone."

It does not appear, however, that this dissatisfaction had any sentimental or æsthetic interest for Spinoza. Rather was it a stimulus to a solution, to the discovery of a true and eternal good.

Postquam me experientia docuit, omnia, quae in communi vita frequenter occurrunt, vana et futilia esse: . . . . constitui tandem inquirere an aliquid daretur, quod verum bonum, et sui communicabile esset, et a quo solo, rejectis caeteris omnibus, animus afficeretur; imo an aliquid daretur, quo invento et acquisito, continua ac summa in aeternum fruerer laetitia. (Trac. de Intell. Em., P. 3.)

To this positive interest in the problem we now pass.

SEC. II. THE END PROPOSED BY SPINOZA AS THE SOLUTION.

(The end or ideal/proposed by Spinoza as the solution, and virtually set over against the fleeting, partial goods pursued by the multitude, is that of a true good, a verum bonum, an eternal, infinite good, a fixed good (fixum enim bonum quaerebam), a good "having the power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else;" a good "the discovery and attainment of which would enable one to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness." But how is such a good to be obtained? Spinoza says that he made many efforts to arrive at this new principle, or at any rate at a

I "Videbantur porro ex eo haec orta esse mala, quod tota felicitas aut infelicitas in hoc solo sita est, videlicet, in qualitate objecti, cui adhaeremus amore. Nam propter illud, quod non amatur, nunquam orientur lites, nulla erit tristitia, si pereat, nulla invidia, si ab alio possideatur, nullus timor, nullum, odium, et, ut verbo dicam, nullae commotiones animi: quae quidem omnia contingunt in amore eorum, quae perire possunt, uti haec omnia, de quibus modo locuti sumus." (Trac, de Intell. Em., p. 5.)

certainty concerning its existence, without changing the conduct and usual plan of his life, but in vain. Compromise was impossible. Either the ordinary pursuits and ideals of life must be abandoned, or else the quest for the verum bonum. He felt that he must choose between a possessed good uncertain and transient in its nature, and a good not uncertain in its nature (fixum enim bonum quaerebam), but uncertain in the possibility of its attainment.

Further reflection convinced me that, if I could really get to the root of the matter, I should be leaving certain evils for a certain good. I thus perceived that I was in a state of great peril, and I compelled myself to seek with all my strength for a remedy, however uncertain it might be; as a sick man struggling with a deadly disease, when he sees that death will surely be upon him unless a remedy be found, is compelled to seek such a remedy with all his strength, inasmuch as his whole hope lies therein.'

Spinoza's logical method, in the largest sense of the word, was conceived in this struggle. The fundamental significance of the logical method was, and is, that it emerged in the course of the struggle, and that it began at once to exercise a modifying influence upon the conflicting elements, transforming the end and discovering the means for its realization. The end is transformed by being stated in intellectual terms. The highest good ceases to be a mystic abstraction set over against the partial, concrete values of the life that now is. Spinoza was forced to recognize that human weakness cannot attain in its own thoughts to the eternal order and fixed laws of nature. At the same time he asserted that a man can conceive a human character much more stable (multo firmiorem) than his own, and that such a man sees no reason why he should not acquire such a character, and is led to seek for means which will bring him to this pitch of perfection, calling everything which will serve as such a means a true good. The highest good is that a man should arrive, together with other individuals if possible, at the possession of this character.3 And now comes Spinoza's statement of what this character is, a statement which, in virtue of its formulation in intellectual terms, opens the way to a

1"Assidua autem meditatione eo perveni, ut viderem, quod tum, modo possem penitus deliberare, mala certa pro bono certo omitterem. Videbam enim me in summo versari periculo, et me cogi, remedium, quamvis incertum, summis viribus quaerere; veluti aeger lethali morbo laborans, qui ubi mortem certam praevidet ni adhibeatur remedium, illud ipsum, quamvis incertum, summis viribus cogitur quaerere, nempe in eo tota ejus spes est sita." (Trac. de Intell. Em., p. 4.)

2" Incitatur ad media quaerendum, quae ipsum ad talem ducant perfectionem: et omne illud, quod potest esse medium, ut eo perveniat, vocatur verum bonum." (Ibid., p. 6.)

3" Summum autem bonum est eo pervenire, ut ille cum aliis individuis, si fieri potest, tali natura fruatur." (Ibid.)