motion in an animal could be cut and the others

left uninjured, the animal would e incapable of expressing pain,-it might feel pain, and yet seem not to feel it. There is a mutual dependence in all the different parts of our organization. The circulation of the blood is necessary to the functions of every part. By this the nervous system, the muscular system, and, in short, the whole frame is supported, disorders repaired, and the animal heat preserved. Yet the circulation of the blood is maintained by the muscular action of the heart and blood-vessels: the action of the heart and blood-vessels is stimulated by the vital air which is brought by the blood from the lungs: the action of the lungs is dependent on the nervous system, and is partly voluntary, although it may be for some time artificially maintained after the nervous system is destroyed. Again, the constant waste of blood must be replaced by fresh supplies. Hence, the whole is dependent on the functions of the stomach and intestinal canal, together with the fluids which are secreted for the purpose of digesting the food. Yet the functions of these parts are dependent on the circulation, and the digestive fluids are supplied by it. Farther, the food must be provided by the hands, and masticated and swallowed before it can be digested. A vast multitude of muscular actions are necessary to these several ends, and every one of these muscular actions is de

pendent on the circulation of the blood, and on the nervous system. Thus, no part of a man is formed to exist without another. One general design is manifest in the body. The whole is obviously intended to be governed by one interest, and to be actuated by one mind.

CHAPTER VIII.

OF EMOTION-DESIRE-VOLITION-HABIT-PASSION-APPETITE.

THE majority of our conceptions are not indifferent to the mind, but involve some degree either of pleasure or of pain, and are entertained either with satisfaction or dislike. The pain or pleasure thus involved is not to be considered as any thing separable from the conception, but is merely a quality or invariable concomitant of the conception itself. In many of our conceptions, this quality is so slight as to be scarcely, if at all, perceptible. In few of our simple conceptions is it very strong or lively.

Emotions arise from the combination of various conceptions, in such a manner that the pleasure or pain of each is heightened by the assemblage of homogeneous or contrasted ideas, as tints in painting derive value from the harmony and opposition of colours. The pleasure or pain of each of the single conceptions being thus heightened, the result of the whole is an agi

tation of mind, which is pleasant or painful according as the preponderating ideas are so; and this mental state affects the body with a corresponding agitation, which, from being an inseparable attendant, is felt as if part of the emotion. The marked degree in which bodily agitation is felt in all emotions, has caused them to be referred to the heart, as if they had their seat there. But it is ever to be remembered that these bodily sensations are but the effects of the mental state, and are not to be confounded with it. And when we treat of emotions as mental phenomena, we ought not to consider them as in a separate department from our intellectual states. It is foolish, in a philosophical work, to classify mental phenomena according to the part of the body supposed to be most affected, whether that be the head or the heart. The mind's emotions are intellectual states, and subject to all the laws of such. The bodily agitation which attends them does not alter the case. That is not to be overlooked in a description of any emotion; but it affords no reason for classifying the mind's emotions separately from its conceptions, as if the two could for an instant be separated, even in thought. An emotion, we repeat, is only the combination of conceptions in such a manner, that the pleasure or pain, which forms a feature of the individual conceptions, is heightened, in the general result, to a degree of agitation.

Desire arises from the comparison of our present condition, with what it would be made by the addition of some possible good. It is not simply the conception of that possible good, neither does it always involve an idea of the means of attaining it :-We desire many things which we do not know how to attain, and the desire of attaining them is what prompts us to devise the means. When a man desires any object, he fixes his mind steadily upon the conception of it, as something the possession of which would in some respect better his condition. There is both a pleasant and a painful feeling attendant on desire. The man conceives the object as good,as what would contribute to his happiness:-That conception is pleasant. But then at the same time he conceives his present condition as defective without it: This is painful; and, in some degree, it is unavoidable, for to conceive a condition better than his present, is, at the same time, to conceive his present as worse than that. Hence the uneasiness of desire. In mild and moderate desire, the agreeable feeling may predominate; but such desire does not strongly prompt to act, nor is much disappointment experienced on failing to attain the object. It is the uneasiness of feeling our condition defective without the object, that prompts to the most strenuous exertion. A simple illustration of the truth of these remarks may be found in two common modes of expressing desire. If a man says that