surely more than demonstrated that God is incapable of any vindictive disposition towards any of his creatures.

The proper object of punishment is to enforce the observance of the laws. The proper object of laws is to maintain social order, individual security, mutual confidence, and universal happiness. These objects are sometimes lost sight of in human legislation, and are never perfectly attainable. In the Divine government the law is perfect, and the punishment must be sufficient to ensure its complete inviolability. The chief defect of human government is the difficulty of conviction, and the consequent hope of escaping punishment. In all cases it has been found that extreme severity, is less efficacious than moderate punishment with increased certainty of detection. In the Divine government the omniscience of God prevents the possibility of escape: but this truth will be of no avail unless it be known and thoroughly believed by men. Mild or short punishments, however, are insufficient to make a lasting impression, and serve to suppress crime, without eradicating it. Man cannot eradicate crime, and, therefore, must be content with suppressing it; but the Divine purpose, being to assert a perfect and holy law, and to maintain it inviolate to all eternity, requires an awful and effectual sanction. In treating of the Being and attributes of God, we have

already demonstrated the existence of God's retributive justice, and have shown that wisdom and benevolence are its foundation. Benevolence seeks the end, which we have laid down above as the proper object and effect of right and inviolable laws, wisdom directs the necessary means, by the appointment of inevitable and immutable sanctions.

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Now is there any thing in all this, which is inconsistent with the preceding view of human agency? Nothing. On the contrary, that view is necessary, to afford the assurance that right means, used for the prevention of crime, and for the promotion of God's wise and benevolent designs, will be followed by the desired effect, as certainly as any other cause is followed by its effect. But if human actions were contingent, — if the will were not determined by motives, then there would be no use for either offering rewards, or threatening punishments: these could not have any effect in leading men to virtue: and if they had no certain effect of that kind, they would be not only useless, but also totally unjustifiable. But when the physical laws of human agency are fixed and certain, then rewards and punishments may properly enter into the system; and these, as well as persuasion, advice, threatenings, and promises, receive a natural efficacy as motives of conduct, thus forming an integral part of the

great series of causes and effects, which God has put in operation for glorious and benevolent pur

poses.

On these principles, however, it is necessary that the means should not overbalance the end: that is, the severity of the sanction must not outweigh the benevolent intention of the law, -the evil inflicted must not be equal to the good to be attained, the misery imposed must not equal the evil thereby removed or prevented, — otherwise there were neither wisdom nor benevolence displayed, but a mere exchange and substitution of one evil for another. But we know not how extensive an end may be served in the universe of God, by the example of this small world; and, were even the whole of its inhabitants doomed for ever to suffer the penalty of sin, the amount of suffering thus supposed might be but a drop, to the amount of sinless happiness, secured, by this dreadful example, to the rest of the universe. I apprehend, however, that this would not be consistent with God's distributive justice, which implies an equal regard and consideration for all his creatures, and therefore forbids the happiness of one world to be procured by the everlasting misery of another. The same reasoning applies to individuals. It follows, therefore, that the inviolability of God's laws cannot, in accordance with his demonstrable perfections, be maintained by the eternal sufferings of a part of his creatures, and

consequently, that the future punishments of men dying in their sins, will not be never-ending, or eternal, in the strict and absolute sense of these words; at least, if they be so, it must be owing to some necessary imperfection in his work, and not to his voluntary design, for he desires the happiness of each, and is not willing that any should perish. Now whether there be such necessary imperfection as this we cannot perhaps tell; but it seems probable that there is no imperfection in his work, for which his wisdom cannot devise a remedy; and if his wisdom can, his benevolence will. Farther, it is manifest that the eternity of punishment supposes the eternity of sin, for it is impossible that any being should continue to suffer eternally, who has long ceased from sin, and become holy, and such as God may approve and love; and this makes it more and more evident, that the supposition of eternal punishment implies eternal and irremediable imperfection in God's work, for sin is imperfection. But as we have every reason to believe that God will make his work perfect, we have thus ground to think, that he will ultimately make sin and suffering to cease. And, if it be so, that glorious eternity will make all temporary disparity of condition, of whatever degree and whatever duration, to be as nothing, at least, not to be named as affecting the distributive justice of God. For there. may be differences of happiness, and degrees of

glory; but these do not interfere with his impartiality. It is not necessary that all should be made perfectly alike in these respects, any more than that all should possess equal intellectual powers. It is enough for each to know, that he has deserved nothing, and that God has given him all things; and the goodness of God may thus be vindicated to every individual separately. But his goodness could not so well be vindicated to individuals, if he created them, foreknowing that their lot would be eternal misery; for in that case, it had been better for them never to have been created. Therefore, whether we reason on the general distributive justice of God, or on his goodness to his creatures individually, we equally arrive at the conclusion, that no creature shall inherit eternal sufferings, in the absolute sense of the words, unless it be from some necessary imperfection in the Creator's work, which Infinite Wisdom, Infinite Power, and Infinite Benevolence, could not remedy. Such is the evident conclusion of reason. But does not scripture declare the eternity of future punishments, without supposing any such imperfection in the work of the Creator?-It does, and in very plain terms. Then is not scripture plainly contrary to reason?—It is not. Here is a seeming paradox, but it will be remembered that in last chapter we showed a difference between truth absolute and truth relative, and that what is abso