to be sure an antecedent of more importance, but it is still a mere antecedent, be it as uniform as you will and its uniform conjunction with its consequent requires to be accounted for as much other sequence.

as any

Absurd, unaccountable, unpardonable sophistry! It glares even through the dense and almost impenetrable panoply of his luxuriant eloquence. “It is enough," says he, "for our devotion, to trace every where the characters of the Divinity, of provident arrangement prior to this system of things,—and to know, therefore, that without that divine will as ANTECEDENT, nothing could have been." It is enough,-but what is implied in that expression, without Him nothing COULD have been? Does it not mean, that without Him nothing had power to be, and that, consequently, in Him all power centres? It is from involving in an unfair and sophistical manner our natural ideas of power, that this sentence is at all satisfactory:-the mention of an antecedent, though that word stands prominently forward, produces no effect whatever in satisfying our minds.

Dr. Brown, has indeed, amply proved, that there is not literally speaking, any tie or link between a cause and its effect,-nothing intermediate which constitutes a bond of union. But who ever affirmed that there is? - not Dr. Reid at least, nor any other philosopher that I am

acquainted with. Every body knows that this is a poetical or figurative expression. No doubt we have a curiosity to understand how an effect is produced, and whether there be any intermediate process in its production: and we have a satisfaction when we discover such an intermediate process, because we think, and think justly, that we have made an accession to our knowledge. But no one, I believe, ever imagined that power is something intermediate between a cause and its effect. The universal impression is that the power is resident in the cause. Dr. Brown, therefore, has here been combating a phantom of his own creating, and deserves little credit for his victory.

It may be thought that I have dealt too severely with this eloquent and ingenious philosopher. It must be remembered however, that it is with opinions and with arguments that I have to do, more than with men, and while I strongly condemn the former, I may respect and esteem the latter. Truth must be freely asserted. I hope that the reader is convinced by what has been quoted from Dr. Reid, that that philosopher understood and set forth the laws of physical inquiry, no less than Dr. Brown, and that these laws are no way endangered by our continuing to entertain the same ideas of cause and effect, which were entertained by Bacon, and by Newton.

66

It now only remains to place in as clear a light as possible the idea which we have of power. And I observe in the first place, that although we cannot know what power is, we may yet know that it is, and must be. It must be allowed," says Mr. Hume,* "that when we know a power, we know that very circumstance in the cause by which it is enabled to produce the effect; for these are supposed to be synonymous:" but this argument is fully answered by the observation which has just been made. We do not know what substance is, yet we know that there is substance, and we have an idea of it:-not indeed an idea founded on a knowledge of its essence, but a clear relative idea. Even so we have no knowledge of what power is, but we have a relative idea of it, just as clear as that which we have of substance. When we see one event immediately and invariably followed by another, we conclude that there must be a reason for this invariable sequence; and that reason is-power, - power existing somewhere, no matter whether in the immediate antecedent or elsewhere. No, replies Dr. Brown ;-there must be a reason for it, but that reason is simply the will of God. Well,the will of God is immediately and invariably

* Hume's Essays. Inquiry concerning Human Understanding. Section vii. Part i.

followed by its accomplishment:-here is another invariable sequence: there must be a reason for it, and the reason is-Almighty power. Power then in our idea of it, is not invariable antecedence, but it is the reason of that invariable antecedence.

This will help us to a proper definition of that idea. What is the reason that the will of God is uniformly followed by its fulfilment ?-it is his power, and that is nothing separable from his own infinite nature, but forms an essential part of it. Nor do I think it probable that the power of God is the only power in the universe. It seems much more agreeable to reason to believe that there are derived and dependent powers, as well as that which is underived, independent, and infinite. God has called into existence certain beings and objects, of certain fixed natures, and their natures are just what he pleases to make them. Why then may he not have created these with natures adapted for giving rise to certain changes, when brought into certain relations with other objects.

Let it be understood then that though our idea of power is entirely relative to the effects, which, in certain circumstances, it is capable of producing, yet power itself is neither a relation, nor the invariableness of a relation, but is something inherent in the nature of a being or object, and inseparable from it, so that it continues to exist

even when no occasion is given for its exercise. We may, therefore, define power underived to be -That in the essential nature of a self-existent being, by reason of which his will is always followed by its accomplishment: and we define power derived to be-That in the nature of a created being or object, by reason of which it is adapted for giving rise to certain changes, when brought into certain relations with other beings or objects. But whether we adopt the opinion that there are created and derived powers or not, we cannot by any possibility divest ourselves of the idea that there must be power somewhere, and, if not in the objects which we observe, in Him, who created and disposed them.

The idea of cause generally includes that of power, though we use that word in different senses, and, as Dr. Reid well observes, it very often signifies no more than the uniform antecedent in a sequence, or a law of nature of which a certain effect is a necessary consequence: such especially is its use in natural philosophy. But in common life we generally attach to it the idea of power, as when we say that nothing can begin to exist without a cause, or that wherever there is a change there must have been a cause, or when we speak of the Almighty as the Great First Cause of all. And, although in the phenomena of nature we cannot predict à priori, what effect will follow from a given cause, nor know,

E