and absolute infinity both of immensity and fulness.

From hence it follows, that the self-existent Being must be a most simple, unchangeable, incorruptible being, without parts, figure, motion, divisibility, or any other such affections as we find in matter.

It is therefore evident that the self-existent Being must be infinite in the strictest and most absolute sense; but this manner of perfect infinity it is impossible for our finite understandings to comprehend or explain. Yet that the thing is true that he actually must be omnipresent we evidently see.

VII. The self-existent Being must of necessity be one. For necessity absolute in itself is simple, uniform, universal.

[This proposition answering to the seventh of Wollaston, the farther illustration is similar.]

VIII. The self-existent and original cause of all things must be an Intelligent Being: for

1st. 'Tis impossible that any effect should have any perfection which was not in the cause, for if it had, then that perfection would be caused by nothing, which is a plain contradiction. Now an unintelligent being cannot be endued with all the perfections of all things in the world, because intelligence is one of those perfections. All things,

therefore, cannot arise from an unintelligent oriand consequently, the self-existent being

ginal

must of necessity be Intelligent.

2nd. Intelligence is a distinct perfection, and cannot arise from any combination of unintelligent figure and motion. Either, therefore, there must have been an infinite succession of men, of whom yet no one has a necessary, but every one a dependent existence; or else those intelligent beings must at some time have arisen out of that which had no such quality as sense or consciousness or intelligence; or else they must have been produced by some intelligent superior Being. But as the two first of these suppositions are impossible, the last alone remains for us.

3d. (Leaving for a moment the direct line of our demonstration, and turning our attention to the visible world,) That the self-existent and original cause of all things is an Intelligent Being, appears abundantly from the excellent variety, order, beauty, and wonderful contrivance, and fitness of all things in the world to their proper and respec

tive ends.

IX. That the self-existent and original cause of all things, is a Being possessing freedom to act according to his intelligent choice, not bound down by the blind necessity of irrational natures, nor yet by the dependent laws of creature agency, but in his unchangeable and intelligent perfection un

limited, doing all things according to the immutable intelligence of his own self-existent nature, in counsel and in purpose from eternity to eternity the same.

[I have somewhat modified the statement of this proposition, retaining all that is essential, but avoiding all allusion to some irrelevant questions, which Clarke has very improperly introduced, and erroneously handled, in the illustration of this and the following proposition.]

X. The self-existent Being, the supreme cause of all, must of necessity have infinite power: for all things were made by him, and are entirely dependent on him, and the powers of all things, being derived from him, are all to him subordinate.

XI. The Supreme Cause of all things must of necessity be infinitely wise. This proposition is evidently consequent upon those which have preceded.

XII. The Supreme Cause and Author of all things must of necessity be a Being of infinite goodness, justice, truth, and all other moral perfections; such as become the supreme Governor and Judge of the world. This proposition is deduced from his wisdom and intellectual nature, discerning and

approving the fitness of things in the great universal system of his own appointment.

ON comparing these two series of propositions it will appear, that Clarke had improved on the argument of Wollaston, and the reasoning of the latter is useful to illustrate the demonstration of the former. There cannot rest on my mind the shadow of a doubt that the argument is conclusive. I see the whole steps as clearly as a demonstration of Euclid. I am doubtful, however, whether the man who does not apprehend it in the simple form in which it is here presented, will be much aided by learned illustrations; the best thing for him will be to discipline his understanding by judicious exercise; and if after all he cannot see it, why then I cannot help it, I cannot give sight to the blind. Probably, however, he may see and apprehend the form in which the argument is placed in my thirteenth chapter.

After attending to the brief view which has been given nearly in Clarke's own words, the reader will be somewhat astonished at the following sentence of Stewart. "The substance of Clarke's

argument," says he, "amounts to the following proposition, that space and time are only abstract conceptions of an immensity and eternity which force themselves on our belief: and, as immensity and eternity are not substances, they must be the

attributes of a Being, who is necessarily Immense and Eternal.” * This, indeed, is a very singular mistake, in which Mr. Stewart has been learnedly followed by Lord Brougham.† It is true that, in illustrating his third proposition, Clarke has indulged himself in some speculations of this kind, being seduced by the example of Cudworth and of Butler. But these are not essential to his demonstration, which is formed more after the fashion of Wollaston than of these authors. So far is Mr. Stewart's statement from being true, that Mr. William Gillespie, author of a recent attempt to establish a demonstration on that idea of Cudworth and Butler, has thought it necessary to confute Clarke, as he thinks he has done. But the result of Mr. Gillespie's work, which I have attentively studied, is to show the inconclusiveness. of reasoning founded on the principle which is embodied in the above sentence of Mr. Stewart, and to exhibit the real source of the objection to Clarke's argument, which arises only from the false principles of Hume, regarding causation. What fools Mr. Hume has made of them all by his ingenious sophistry!

In the plenitude of his Arminian zeal, however, Dr. Clarke has brought a charge of atheism against Mr. Hobbes, for no other reason, that I

* Stewart's Philos. Act. and Mor. Powers, vol. i. p. 334. + Discourse of Natural Theology.