knowledge of the existence of a self, and of an external world, and of an Absolute Being, is no legitimate outcome of Locke's empiricism; such a nihilism is reached only by ignoring or distorting the psychological basis of Locke's system. Locke at the outset Xclearly presupposes and recognizes the reality of mind as something which is not the product of experience. Of the existence of the self as a thinking being, we have, according to Locke, intuitive and necessary knowledge. Locke could well assent to Des Cartes' cogito, ergo sum." And likewise, in respect to the reality of an external world or a not-self, despite his naïve and indefensible realism, Locke remains true to the psychological fact that we do not and cannot rest satisfied with our merely suggestive states-the sense data; but we postulate a reality that is independent of our ideas, and to which our ideas must correspond if they are to be anything more than fictions of the imagination. Locke teaches that the existence of an external world is inseparable from the ideas we have of it, and therein he is true to a fundamental deliverance of consciousness. It is this basis of psychological fact that Hume does not accept in its integrity, but takes merely the conscious state or feeling without its implicate of a subject and a something not the psychical state as the object. Now Locke, notwithstanding his limitation of knowledge respecting the self and external objects, teaches plainly that both subject and object are implicated as real existences in the simplest act of knowledge. It cannot, we think, be opposed to this interpretation of Locke, that he reduces the work WHAT of mind to the passive reception of impressions and the mere uniting of ideas to form knowledge. Such an interpretation of Locke's doctrine of ideas is possible only by converting Locke's metaphors into facts. What Locke teaches in this direction is the fact that the individual mind is absolutely dependent upon sense experience for its earliest ideas as the beginning and elements of knowledge. If in this part of the Essay Locke represents the mind as passive and receptive only, such language should be taken in connection with the abundant and explicit statements elsewhere, that the mind exercises powers peculiar to itself and is in all actual knowledge original and creative. Should it be urged that such functions of mind are not possible if Locke's empirical explanation of knowledge is to be taken in earnest and carried to its consistent issue, it may with more justice to him be replied, we are bound to make Locke's empiricism consistent with his explicit recognition of essentially a priori or non-empirical factors in knowledge; and, if so, Locke's theory of knowledge may lead us in quite a different direction from that taken by Hume, We suggest that the direction in which we may seek a more consequent issue of Locke's philosophy, when interpreted from its aim and prevailing spirit, is the critical philosophy of Kant. The problem of Kant's philosophy was really anticipated by Locke. Kant's more special problem, to determine the possibility, the conditions, and the extent of knowledge that is independent of experience, becomes, in Kant's solution of it, the more general problem of Locke, viz., to determine the certainty and the extent of human knowledge. And however widely Kant's method departs from the method of Locke, and however profound the differences are that separate in some respects the critical idealism of Kant from the naïve and hardly consistent realism of Locke, the two philosophers reach conclusions so much in agreement respecting the empirical conditions and limits of human knowledge, as to justify the assertion that it is toward Kant and critical philosophy, rather than toward Hume and his successors, that Locke's theory of knowledge legitimately tends. BIBLIOGRAPHY. We present the bibliography relating to Locke's life and his writings in the following scheme : A.-LOCKE'S WRITINGS. I. Philosophical Writings. 1. "An Epitome of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding," prepared at the request of Le Clerc, in the autumn of 1687, and published in the “Bibliothèque Universelle" for June, 1688. The original manuscript of this "Epitome" is still in existence. A number of copies of the "Epitome" were printed separately for friends of Locke, but only one of these is extant. 2. "The Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke's manuscript of the first edition was sent to the press in May, 1689, and the work was issued from the press probably in March of the following year. Three subsequent editions were published during the lifetime of Locke; the second edition, containing a number of changes, was issued in 1694; the third edition in 1695, and the fourth in the autumn of 1699. This last edition contained two additional chapters: the chapter upon Enthusiasm and the one upon Association of Ideas; and besides these additions the chapter upon Power had been rewritten. A French version of the Essay was executed by Pierre Costa, a friend of Le Clerc and of Locke, and published at Amsterdam in 1700, with the title, "Essai Philosophique concernant l'Entendement, où l'ón montre quelle est l'Entendue de nos Connaissances certaines et la Manière dont nous y parvenons." In 1701 a Latin version of the Essay, which had been begun by Bur bridge in 1695, was published in London under the title, De Intellectu Humano." Subsequent editions of the Essay appeared in 1723, 1729, 1742, 1750, 1755, 1758, 1774. Up to the present time upwards of forty editions of the Essay have been published, besides numerous translations in French, German, and Dutch. 3. Essay on the Conduct of the Understanding." A writing intended by Locke to form a chapter in the fourth edition of the Essay, but left by him incomplete, and published probably by his cousin, Peter King, in 1706. 4. "Letters in Reply to Stillingfleet, the Bishop of Worcester." There were three of these letters, and they were a vindication of Locke's doctrine of knowledge against the criticisms that the Bishop of Worcester had directed against the Essay; these letters were published between the years 1692 and 1699, and two of them have been incorporated in some editions of the Essay. II. Ethical and Theological Writings. 1. Small essay in Latin, written in 1661. 2. An unpublished essay on Toleration, 1666. 3. "Epistola de Tolerantia," written in Holland, 1685, addressed to Locke's friend Limborch, and published at London in 1689. 4. Three writings, under the same English title, were published in 1690, 1692, and 1706; the last is only a fragment. 5. "The Reasonableness of Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures," published in 1695. Two vindications of this treatise were published in the years 1695 and 1697. A discourse on Miracles," 1706. 6. 7. Paraphrases and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, First and Second Corinthians, Romans, and Ephesians,” 1705–7. III. Political Writings. I. Two Treatises on Government, 1690. 2. "The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina,” 1720. 3. Some Considerations on the Economy of Lowering 66 |