History of the Problems of Philosophy, Bind 1Macmillan, 1902 |
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absolute according action activity animal spirits Aristotle association of ideas body called Cartesian cause conception connection consciousness consequently correspond Cratylus Democritus Descartes desire determined distinct divine doctrine Dugald Stewart effect elements emotions empirical empiricism Epicureans Epicurus existence experience explained expression external fact faculty feeling freedom habit Heraclitus Herbert Spencer human mind Hume Ibid implies impressions infinite innate instinct intellect intelligible intuition Kant kind knowledge language laws Leibnitz Locke Maine de Biran Malebranche mathematical matter Max Müller means memory mental merely metaphysics method monad movement nature necessary notions object organs origin ourselves passions perceive perception perfect phenomena philosophy physical Plato pleasure and pain possible principle priori priori laws problem psychology pure rational reality reason regards Reid relations sensation sense sensible Socrates soul Spinoza Stoics theory things thought tion true truth understanding unity universal virtue words καὶ
Populære passager
Side 187 - ALL the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, Relations of Ideas, and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or demonstratively certain.
Side 212 - And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every living creature, that was the name thereof.
Side 184 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second.
Side 371 - ... exist, and will discover itself upon a nearer approach. This belief is the necessary result of placing the mind in such circumstances. It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.
Side 113 - I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result ; which therefore we call substance.
Side 64 - It is evident the mind knows not things immediately, but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them. Our knowledge therefore is real only so far as there is a conformity between our ideas and the reality of things.
Side 67 - But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy, which teaches us, that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception...
Side 330 - I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing such or such a particular action.
Side 69 - Here, then, is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other work of nature.
Side 187 - Propositions of this kind are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe. Though there never were a circle or triangle in nature, the truths demonstrated by Euclid would for ever retain their certainty and evidence.