And wherefore should the clamorous voice of woe
Intrude upon mine ear?”

The pleasure which accompanies the kindly affections of our nature, by being too eagerly sought after as an end, has often proved a snare to inexperienced youth. That reward which the Author of nature has connected with virtue, has, in this way, been mingled with criminal indulgence; and the charms of pure emotion have been transferred to vice and folly. This perversion, however, is evidently contrary to the design of the Deity in the constitution which he has given us, whose object in connecting the agreeable emotions with the exercise of benevolence is, to induce us to cultivate with peculiar care a class of our active principles so immediately subservient to the happiness of human society. We are thus drawn on to virtue by the enticement of mental gratification; and the enjoyment of pleasure is made subservient to our progress in moral improvement.

The connexion of pleasure with the benevolent affections has given rise to a question among moralists, whether these affections are not selfish in their origin, and indulged for the sake of the pleasure connected with them. It is quite unnecessary to enter here on a serious refutation of the theory of selfishness founded on the opinion implied in this question. This has been already done by several writers of eminence; and the conclusion which they have fully established, though opposed to the views of many ancient and modern philosophers, is not only agree

able to the obvious appearance of the past, but is strongly confirmed by the analogy of the other active powers of the mind. The selfish system, like every other system which substitutes analogies for facts, and traces many classes of dissimilar phenomena to one principle, takes its rise from a superficial view of the facts to be accounted for; and inasmuch as it is an attempt to degrade the nature of man, possesses not the beauty even of a plausible speculation.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONSIDERATION OF AFFECTIONS CONTINUED: THE PARENTAL AND FILIAL AFFECTIONS-GRATITUDE-PITY-SYMPATHY-LOVE-PATRIOTISM.

I CANNOT enter at great length into the consideration of each of our benevolent affections. Nor is this at all necessary, since we rather require knowledge for their proper direction and regulation than information concerning their nature and effects. Some of them are more particularly called natural, because the want of them is regarded as an extraordinary deviation from nature, revolting to our feelings. And on this ground their existence and operation are assumed in the legislative enactments of all nations; which are framed on the principle that nature has provided the parental and filial affections to supersede in a great measure the utility and necessity of laws as to the duties implied in such relations.

Towards offspring, there is in man, as in other

animals, a peculiarly strong affection, and a tender solicitude for their preservation and happiness. In mankind this affection continues during life, as parents may always do some good to their posterity. It descends to grand-children, and their children, with almost undiminished strength. In the brutes it is found where the young need assistance; where they do not, it scarcely exists. It lasts till the young can support themselves, then generally ceases. All this carries with it manifest evidences of design in the Author of nature. Similar affections, though weaker, are found generally to attend the ties of blood among collaterals. These tender affections are the springs of more than one half of the labours and cares of mankind: they rouse the mind to things great and honourable. By their means the heart is rendered more susceptible of every kind, and tender, and social affection.

Next to the affections of kindred, perhaps, the strongest and most universally operative principle of our nature is gratitude for favours received. So confident are we of the existence of this principle, that in the intercourse of society, its influence, nay, its active influence, is pre-supposed; and, accordingly, the offence committed against a benefactor, for the commission of which in other circumstances we could suggest many apologies, shocks us as indicating an unusual degree of depravity. The obligation conferred, and the gratitude which is due, must bear some proportion to the circumstances in which the favour is communicated. Thus, the feeding of an enemy in any circumstances is an act of virtuous kindness calculated to awaken the more generous feelings of the human

heart. But what should we think due to the person, who, while enduring himself all the privations of a siege, could rise at the moment of his greatest extremity above the cold and unkindly workings of his mind towards his avowed enemy, and divide with him his last morsel, in opposition to the cravings of the most powerful instinct of his nature?

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On mere indifferent objects, common bounty
Will shower relief; but when our bitterest foe
Lies sunk, disarm'd, and desolate, then! then!
To feel the mercies of a pitying god,

To raise him from the dust, and that best
To triumph o'er him, is heroic goodness.

way

Whether there be, or be not," says Dr. Reid, "in the more sagacious brutes, something that may be called gratitude, I will not dispute. We must allow this important difference between their gratitude and that of the human kind, that, in the last, the mind of the benefactor is chiefly regarded; in the first, the external action only. A brute animal will be as kindly affected to him who feeds it in order to kill and eat it, as to him who does it from affection. A man may be justly entitled to our gratitude, for an office that is useful, though it be at the same time disagreeable; and not only for doing, but for forbearing what he had a right to do. Among men, it is not every beneficial office that claims our gratitude, but such only as are not due to us in justice. A favour alone gives a claim to gratitude; and a favour must be something more than justice requires. It does not appear that brutes have any conception of justice. They can

neither distinguish hurt from injury, nor a favour from a good office that is due."

Though some savage tribes appear to be destitute of pity to the distressed, I agree with the most distinguished moralists in regarding it as an original principle of the human mind, conferred by the Author of nature for the most valuable ends. It may, indeed, be modified by circumstances, as may all the powers and tendencies of our nature; but its characteristic is to prompt us to give all the aid in our power to our suffering fellow-creatures, independently of our reflection, and without any reference to our enjoyment. Several considerations might be mentioned in support of this opinion. The first is, that it is as necessary for the happiness, and even the virtue of mankind as any other of our active principles. In a world where there is so much physical evil, and where the sufferer is so much dependent on the sympathy and benevo lent aid of others, have we any reason to conclude, from what we know of the benevolence of the Deity, that he would intrust our relief to the slow deductions of reason, or to the operations of fancy? If there have been implanted in our nature, affections and desires for the attainment of other ends, why should we suppose that there is no original affection in the human mind, whose ultimate object is the relief of the distressed; especially as this object is so necessary to the circumstances in which mankind are placed.

But the originality of this principle is farther confirmed by the fact, that its operation is co-extensive with the human race. The exceptions are easily