exists in man, and in the inferior animals; in him it is a social feeling closely allied to his rational nature, and accompanied in its exercise with the powers of the understanding and the affections of the heart; in them it is only a gregarious tendency, prompting them to herd together. Man has many feelings to gratify by associating with other beings possessing intelligence and thought, and the pleasure connected with their gratification would lead him, independently of any original desire for society, to seek for the means of this enjoyment; and hence some authors have been induced to display their ingenuity, by disputing its existence. Whatever opinion we form on this speculative question, the desire of society is equally entitled to be ranked among the natural and universal principles of our constitution. Entire solitude, it might be said, is disagreeable to man, because man sensibly feels his weakness and dependence. Subject to so many necessities, and endowed with so many different susceptibilities of enjoyment, man feels himself helpless and wretched alone; and to avoid this feeling of helplessness and wretchedness, he seeks society: and when he cannot have society in the individuals of his own species, he strives to fill up the void of which he is conscious by making companions of the lower animals, or by attaching himself to inanimate objects. And as an additional proof that his desire of society takes its rise from his sense of weakness and dependence, he is much more anxious for company, and feels himself more secure when he enjoys it, when in the dark, than on other occasions. This view of the matter is not destitute of plausibility; and accordingly some ingenious writers have attempted to trace the origin of society chiefly to that regard which every man feels for his interest and security. But plausible as this view may seem, I cannot agree to it, were there no other consideration to prove its fallacy than this;-that the objects of the strongest desires can only be fully enjoyed in the society of those we love. What is rank, or wealth, or fame, if we have no friends to share these advantages with us, and to sympathize with us in our joy? I do not remember a more forcible illustration of the truth of this remark, than is contained in the memorable words of Dr. Johnson, addressed to the nobleman who had left him to struggle with difficulties during the compilation of his Dictionary; but who began to court a renewal of his acquaintance in the expectation of the work being dedicated to him on its appearance: "The notice which you have been pleased to take of my labours, had it been early, had been kind; but it has been delayed till I am indifferent, and cannot enjoy it,―till I am solitary, and cannot impart it,―till I am known, and do not want it." SECTION III.-The Desire of Esteem. The next of the desires which I shall notice is the desire of esteem. Of all our principles of action, this among the first which discovers itself. is "No other branch of the human constitution," says Lord Kaimes," shews more visibly our destination for society, nor tends more to our improvement, than the desire for esteem; for as the whole conveniencs of life are derived from mutual aid and support in so ciety, it ought to be a capital aim to secure these conveniences, by gaining the esteem and affection of others." Reason, indeed, dictates that lesson: but reason alone is not sufficient in a matter of such importance; and the desire mentioned is a motive more powerful than reason, to be active in gaining esteem and affection. That desire, at the same time, is finely djusted to the other parts of our constitution, by promoting all the moral virtues; for what means are there to attract love and esteem so effectual as a virtuous course of life? This desire shews itself in many different ways. That it is a powerful auxiliary to the practice of virtue there can be no doubt; and that it is extremely useful to the community, not only in restraining from the commission of crimes, but in stimulating to the exercise of probity, and justice, and to the attainment of all those accomplishments by which the community can be benefited, is not less evident. It is owing to this principle chiefly, that the mere possession of the most honourable or lucrative office does not satisfy the mind, without some of the talents, at least, which are requisite for the discharge of its duties; and no sooner are our hopes directed to any important profession or employment, than it becomes the object of our ambition to prepare ourselves for its respectable exercise. We are anxious to obtain the approbation of others; we seek this by a law of our nature anterior to the pleasure which we feel in its possession; and we are naturally stimulated to deserve that approbation which it is our wish to obtain. We are early taught by experience, how much satisfaction is derived from the esteem of those around us; and knowing that the most likely way to obtain this esteem is to deserve it, we are prompted, even when higher motives are absent, to attain those virtues and that reputation to which society attaches the greatest value. "Man naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of love. He naturally dreads, not only to be hated, but to be hateful; or to be that thing which is the natural and proper object of hatred. He desires, not only praise, but praiseworthiness; or to be that thing which, though it should be praised by nobody, is, however, the natural and proper object of praise." It must be recollected, however, that though the desire of esteem prompts in general to that line of conduct by which esteem is merited, yet that the love of praiseworthiness is by no means derived altogether from the love of praise. These two principles, though they resemble one another, though they are connected, and often blended with one another, are yet, in many respects, distinct and independent of one another. It is from the desire of esteem that the love of fame has its origin; and the love of fame is one of the strongest passions in the youthful and generous breast. This passion is no doubt strengthened by ambition and emulation: but it is chiefly derived from the desire of standing high in the opinion of the public, and of being the object of general acclamation. It is to the love of glory that we may impute much of what is useful, and what is hurtful in the history of man kind; this was the animating principle, which in other ages assembled the multitudes of Greece to the Olympic festivals; and the aspiring candidates who here entered the lists, felt as if the eyes of the civi lized world were turned upon them, and as if the pos: session of the wreath of laurel in the view of so many spectators, gave to this perishable emblem of victory a value which no other object of ambition could possess. The desires of esteem, and power, and superiority, were here all combining to produce an appetite for glory, and to make the attainment of fame the first and the dearest end of existence. And many a generous youth, in every age and among every people, whose imagination had been kindled by the splendours of its own creation, has secretly breathed his desire for distinction in the words of the poet : O rather, rather Had I ne'er seen the vital light of heaven, Joys which the careless brutes possess above us, |