L.'s "Knowledge" and the schoolmaster's.

§ 10. But are we driven to the alternative of agreeing either with Locke or with the schoolmaster? I do not see that we are. The thought which underlies Locke's system of education is this: true knowledge can be acquired only by the exercise of the reason: in childhood the reasoning power is not strong enough for the pursuit of knowledge: knowledge, therefore, is out of the question at that age, and the only thing to be thought of is the formation of habits. Opposed to this we have the schoolmaster's ideal which is governed by examinations. According to this ideal the object of the school course is to give certain "knowledge," linguistic and other, and to fix it in the memory in such a manner that it can be displayed on the day of examination. Knowledge" of this kind often makes no demand whatever on the reasoning faculty, or indeed on any faculty but that of remembering and reproducing what the learner has been told; in extreme cases the memory of mere sounds or symbols suffices.

But after all we are not compelled to choose between these two theories. Take, e.g., the subject which Locke has mentioned, geography. The schoolmasters of the olden time. began with the use of the globes, a plan which, by the way, Locke himself seems to have winked at. His disciple Molyneux tells him of the performances of the small Molyneux. When he was but just turned five he could read perfectly well, and on the globe could have traced out and pointed at all the noted ports, countries, and cities of the world, both land and sea; by five and a half could perform many of the plainest problems on the globe, as the longitude and latitude, the Antipodes, the time with them and other countries, &c. (Molyneux to L., 24th August, 1695.) Here we find a child brought up, without any

"Knowledge" in Geography.

protest from Locke, on mere examination knowledge, which according to Locke himself is not knowledge at all. It is strange that Locke did not at once point out to Moly neux that the child was not really learning what the father supposed him to be learning. When the child turned over the plaster ball and found the word "Paris," the father no doubt attributed to the child much that was in his own mind only. To the child "the Globe" (as Rousseau afterwards said), was nothing but a plaster ball; “Paris” was nothing but some letters marked on that ball. Comenius had already got a notion how children may be given some knowledge of geography. "Children begin geography," said he, "when they get to understand what a hill, a valley, a field, a river, a village, a town is." (Supra, p. 145.) When this beginning has been made, geographical knowledge is at once possible to the child, and not before.

Perfect knowledge in geography, as in most other things, is out of every one's reach. Nobody knows, e.g., all that could be known about Paris. The knowledge its inhabitants have of it is very various, but in all cases this knowledge is far greater than that of a visitor. The visitor's

knowledge again is far greater than that of strangers who have never seen Paris. Nobody, then, can know everything even about Paris; but a child who knows what a large town is, and can fancy to himself a big town called Paris, which is the biggest and most important town in France has some knowledge about it. This must be maintained against Locke. Against the schoolmaster it may be pointed out that making an Eskimo say the words :- "Paris is the capital of France," would not be giving him any knowledge at all; and the same may be said of many "lessons" in

For children, health and habits.

the school-room. If a common sailor were to teach an Eskimo English, he would very likely suppose that when he had taught the sounds "Paris is the capital of France," he had conveyed to his pupil all the ideas which those sounds suggested to his own mind. A common schoolmaster may fall into a similar error.

§ 11. In the most celebrated work which has been affected by the Thoughts of Locke, Rousseau's Emile, we find childhood treated in a manner altogether different from youth the child's education is mainly physical, and instruction is not given till the age of twelve. Locke's system on first sight seems very different to this, but there is a deeper connection between the two than is usually observed. We have seen that Locke allowed nothing to be knowledge that was not acquired by the perception of the intellect. But in children the intellectual power is not yet developed; so according to Locke knowledge properly socalled is not within their reach. What then can the educator do for them? He can prepare them for the age of reason in two ways, by caring first for their physical health, second for the formation of good habits.

§ 12. 1st. On the Continent Locke has always been considered one of the first advocates of physical education, and he does, it is true, give physical education the first place, a feature in his system, which we naturally connect with his study of medicine, and also with the trouble he had all his life with his own health. But care of the body, and especially bodily exercises, were always much thought of in this country, and the main writers on education before Locke, e.g., Sir Thos. Elyot, Mulcaster, Milton, were very emphatic about physical training.

In the autobiography of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, we

Everything educative forms habits.

may see what attention was paid in Locke's own century to this part of education.*

§ 13. 2nd. "That, and that only, is educative which moulds, forms or modifies the soul or mind." (Mark Pattison in New Quarterly Magazine, January, 1880.)

Here we have a proposition which is perhaps seldom denied, but very commonly ignored by those who bring up the young. But Locke seems to have been entirely possessed with this notion, and the greater part of the Thoughts is nothing but a long application of it. The principle which lies at the root of most of his advice, he has himself expressed as follows: "That which I cannot too often inculcate is, that whatever the matter be about which it is conversant whether great or small, the main, I had almost said only thing, to be considered in every action of a child is what influence it will have upon his mind; what habit it tends to, and is likely to settle in him : how it will become him when he is bigger, and if it be encouraged, whither it will lead him when he is grown up." (Thoughts, § 107, p. 86.)

Here we see that Locke differed widely from the schoolmasters of his time, perhaps of all time. A man must be a philosopher indeed if he can spend his life in teaching boys, and yet always think more about what they will be and what they will do when their schooling is over than what they will know. And in these days if we stopped to think at all we should be trodden on by the examiner.+

* For Rabelais, see p. 67 supra.

In the notes to the Cambridge edition of the Thoughts Locke's advice on physical education is discussed and compared with the results of modern science by Dr. J. F. Payne.

"Examinations directed, as the paper examinations of the numerous

Confusion about special cases. Wax.

In this respect Locke has not been surpassed. Like his predecessor Montaigne he took for his centre not the object, knowledge, but the subject, man.*

§ 14. In some other respects he does not seem so happy. He makes little attempt to reach a scientific standpoint and to establish general truths about our common human nature. He thinks not so much of the man as the gentleman, not so much of the common laws of the mind as of the peculiarities of the individual child. He even hints that differences of disposition in children render treatises on education defective if not useless. "There are a thousand other things that may need consideration" he writes "especially if one should take in the various tempers, different inclinations, and particular defaults that are to be found in children and prescribe proper remedies. The variety is so great that it would require a volume, nor would that reach it. Each man's mind has some peculiarity as well as his face, that distinguishes him from all others; and there are possibly scarce two children who can be conducted by exactly the same method: besides that I think a prince, a nobleman, or an ordinary gentleman's son should have different ways of breeding. But having had here only some general views in reference to the main end and aims in education, and those designed for a gentleman's son, whom being then very little I considered only as white paper or wax to be moulded and

examining boards now flourishing are directed, to finding out what the pupil knows, have the effect of concentrating the teacher's effort upon the least important part of his function." Mark Pattison in N. Quart. M., January, 1880.

* Michelet (Nos fils, chap. ij. ad f. p. 170), says of Montaigne's essay : "c'est déjà une belle esquisse, vive et forte, une tentative pour donner, non l'objet, le savoir, mais le sujet, c'est l'homme."