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Second, intellectual development.
accustomed from his earliest years to pray, to think, and to work, is already more than half educated” (Ib. 381).
§ 92. Here we see the main requisites. First the child must pray with faith and love. Next he must think. "The child must think!" exclaims the schoolmaster : "Must he not learn?" To which Pestalozzi would have replied, "Most certainly he must." Learning was not in Pestalozzi's estimation as in Locke's, the "last and least thing, but learning was with him something very different from the learning imparted by the ordinary schoolmaster. Pestalozzi was very imperfectly acquainted with the thoughts and efforts of his predecessors, but the one book on education which he had studied had freed him fro the "idols " of the schoolroom. This book was the Emile of Rousseau, and from it he came no less than Rousseau himself to despise the learning of the schoolmaster. But when he had to face the problem of organizing a course of education for the Y people, Pestalozzi did not agree with Rousseau that the`
first twelve years should be spent in "losing time." No, the children must learn, but they inust learn in such a way as to develop all the powers of the mind. And so Pestalozzi! was led to what he considered his great discovery, viz., that all instruction must be based on "Anschauung."
§ 93. The Germans, who have devoted so much thought and care and effort to education, greatly honour Pestalozzi,* and as his disciples aim at making all elementary instruction
* In 1872, a Congress in which more than 10,000 German elementary teachers were represented, petitioned the Prussian Government for "the organization of training schools in accordance with the pedagogic principles of Pestalozzi, which formerly enjoyed so much favour in Prussia and so visibly contributed to the regeneration of the country."
Learning by "intuition."
We English have troubled ourselves so little about Pestalozzi, or, I might say, about the theory of education, that we have not cared to get equivalent words for Anschauung and anschaulich. For Anschauung "senseimpression" has lately been tried; but this is in two ways defective; for (1) there may be "Anschauungen" beyond the range of the senses, and (2) there is in an "Anschauung" an active as well as a passive element, and this the word "impression" does not convey. The active part is brought out better by 'observation "—the word used by Joseph Payne and James MacAlister; but this seems hardly wide enough. Other writers of English borrow words straight from the French, and talk about "intuition" and "intuitive," words which were taken (first I believe by Kant) from the Latin intueri, "to look at with attention and reflection."
§ 94. I think we shall be wise in following these writers. On good authority I have heard of a German professor who when asked if he had read some large work recently published in the distressing type of his nation, replied that he had not; he was waiting for a French translation. If the Germans find that the French express their thoughts more clearly than they can themselves, we may think ourselves fortunate when the French will act as interpreters. I therefore gladly turn to M. Buisson and translate what he says about “intuition.”
"Intuition is just the most natural and most spontaneous action of human intelligence, the action by which the mind seizes a reality without effort, hesitation, or go-between. It is a 'direct apperception,' made as it were at a glance. If it has to do with some matter within the province of the senses, the senses perceive it at once. Here we have the simplest case of all, the most common, the
Buisson and Jullien on intuition.
most easily noted. If the thing concerned is an idea, a reality, that is, beyond the reach of the senses, we still say that we seize it by intuition when all that is necessary is that it present itself to the mind, and the mind at once grasps it and is satisfied with it without any need of proof or investigation. We advance by intuition whenever our mind, acting by the senses, or by the judgment, or by the conscience, knows things with the same amount of evidence and the same amount of speed that a distinct view of an object affords the eye. So intuition is no separate faculty; it is nothing strange or new in the mind of man. It is just the mind itself 'intuitively' recognising what exists in it or around it" (Les Conferences Péd. faites aux Instituteurs, Delagrave, 1879, p. 331). So the "intuitive method" (to keep the French name for it) is of very wide application. "It appeals to this force sui generis, to this glance of the mind, to this spontaneous spring of the intelligence towards truth." It sets the pupil's mind to work in following his own intellectual instincts. If in our teaching we can use it, we shall have gained, as M. Buisson says, the best helper in the world, viz., the pupil. If he can be got to take an active part in the instruction all difficulty vanishes at once. Instead of having to drag him along, you will see him delighted to keep you company.
$95. According to M. Buisson there are three kinds of intuition-sensuous, intellectual, and moral. Similarly M. Jullien (Esprit de Pestalozzi, 1812, vol. j, p. 152) says that there are" intuitions " of the "internal senses as well as of the external: the "internal senses are four in number: first, the sense for the true; second, the sense for the beautiful; third, the sense for the good; fourth, the sense for the infinite.
Pestalozzi and Locke.
§ 96. Without settling whether this analysis is complete. we shall have no difficulty in admitting that both body and mind have faculties by means of which we apprehend, lay hold of, what is true and right; and it is on the use of these faculties that Pestalozzi bases instruction. No Englishman may have found a good word to indicate Anschauung, but one Englishman at least had the idea of it long before Pestalozzi. More than a century earlier Locke had called knowledge "the internal perception of the mind." "Knowing is seeing," said he; "and if it be so, it is madness to persuade ourselves we do so by another man's eyes, let him use never so many words to tell us that what he asserts is very visible" (Supra p. 222).
§ 97. Thus in theory Pestalozzi was, however unconsciously, a follower of Locke. But in practice they went far asunder. Locke's thoughts were constantly occupied with philosophical investigations, and he seems to have made small account of the intellectual power of children, and to have supposed that they cannot "see" anything at all. Sɔ he cared little what was taught them, and till they reached the age of reason the tutor might give such lessons as would be useful to "young gentlemen," the avowed object being to "keep them from sauntering." His follower Rousseau preferred that the child's mind should not be filled with the traditional lore of the schoolroom, and that the instructor, when the youth reached the age of twelve, should find "an unfurnished apartment to let." Then came Pestalozzi, and he saw that at whatever age the instructor began to teach the child, he would not find an unfurnished apartment, seeing that every child learns continuously from the hour of its birth. And how does the child learn? Not by repeating words which express the thoughts, feelings, and
Subjects for, and art of, teaching.
experiences of other people,* but by his own experiences and feelings, and by the thoughts which these suggest to him.
§ 98. Elementary education then on its intellectual side is teaching the child to think. The proper subjects of thought for children Pestalozzi held to be the children's surroundings, the realities of their own lives, the things that affect them and arouse their feelings and interests. Perhaps he did not emphasize interest as much as Herbart has done since; but clearly an Anschauung or "intuition" is only possible when the child is interested in the thing observed.
§ 99. The art of teaching in Pestalozzi's system consists in analyzing the knowledge that the children should acquire about their surroundings, arranging it in a regular sequence, and bringing it to the children's consciousness gradually and in the way in which their minds will act upon it. In this way they learn slowly, but all they learn is their own. They are not like the crow drest up in peacock's feathers, for
* Did Pestalozzi make due allowance for the system of thought which every child inherits? Croom Robertson in "How we came by our Knowledge" (Nineteenth Century, No. 1, March, 1877), without men ioning Pestalozzi, seems to differ from him. Croom Robertson says that “ Children being born into the world are born into society, and are acted on by overpowering social influences before they have any chance of being their proper selves. The words and sentences that fall upon a child's ear and are soon upon his lips, express not so much his subjective experience as the common experience of his kind, which becomes as it were an objective rule or measure to which his shall conform. He does, he must, accept what he is told; and in general he is only too glad to find his own experience in accordance with it. We use our incidental, by which I mean our natural subjective experience, mainly to decipher and verify the ready-made scheme of knowledge that is given us en bloc with the words of our mother-tongue" (pp. 117, 118).