The Works of John Locke, Bind 1Thomas Tegg, 1823 |
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Side lxi
... ideas , the materials of all our knowledge . CHAPTER VIII . OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING SIMPLE IDEAS . SECT . 1-6 . Positive ideas from privative causes . 7 , 8. Ideas in the mind , qualities in bodies . 9 , 10. Primary and ...
... ideas , the materials of all our knowledge . CHAPTER VIII . OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING SIMPLE IDEAS . SECT . 1-6 . Positive ideas from privative causes . 7 , 8. Ideas in the mind , qualities in bodies . 9 , 10. Primary and ...
Side lxv
... positive idea of infinity . 15 , 19. What is positive , what negative , in our idea of infinite . 16 , 17. We have no positive idea of infinite duration . 18. No positive idea of infinite space . 20. Some think they have a positive idea ...
... positive idea of infinity . 15 , 19. What is positive , what negative , in our idea of infinite . 16 , 17. We have no positive idea of infinite duration . 18. No positive idea of infinite space . 20. Some think they have a positive idea ...
Side lxvi
... ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection . SECT . CHAPTER XXI . 1. This idea how got . OF POWER ... positive good determines not the will , but uneasiness . 36. Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to ...
... ideas of the passions are got from sensation and reflection . SECT . CHAPTER XXI . 1. This idea how got . OF POWER ... positive good determines not the will , but uneasiness . 36. Because the removal of uneasiness is the first step to ...
Side 59
... idea of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and others of his ... positive ideas , to which they pro- perly and immediately belong , are ... idea of a relation , without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs , and ...
... idea of identity will not be the same that Pythagoras and others of his ... positive ideas , to which they pro- perly and immediately belong , are ... idea of a relation , without having any at all of the thing to which it belongs , and ...
Side 72
... idea , which we are most concerned to have , it is a strong presumption against all other innate charac- ters . I ... positive idea , which we take to be the substratum , or support , of those ideas we know . No proposi- tions can be ...
... idea , which we are most concerned to have , it is a strong presumption against all other innate charac- ters . I ... positive idea , which we take to be the substratum , or support , of those ideas we know . No proposi- tions can be ...
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action amongst appear assent Bishop of Worcester body cerning certainly CHAPTER colours complex ideas conceive concerning consider desire desire happiness determined discourse distance distinct ideas distinguished Essay eternity existence extension faculties farther finite ginal happiness hath idea of infinite idea of space imagine imprinted infinity innate ideas innate principles inquiry JOHN LOCKE Julian period knowledge lady Masham liberty Locke Locke's lord lord Shaftesbury lordship mankind matter maxims measure memory men's mind mixed modes motion names nature neral ness never objects observe occasion operations opinion perceive perception perhaps pleasure and pain positive idea present primary qualities produce propositions prove reason receive sensation and reflection sensation or reflection senses sensible sideration signify simple ideas simple modes sion soever solidity soul stand substance suppose taken notice things thoughts tion truth understanding uneasiness volition whereby wherein whereof whilst words
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Side 82 - Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, From experience. In that all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself.
Side 83 - First, Our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them: and thus we come by those ideas we have, of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions.
Side 120 - ... nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us, and depend on those primary qualities, viz.
Side 278 - Who will render to every man according to his deeds: To them who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honour and immortality, eternal life: But unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth, but obey unrighteousness, indignation and wrath, Tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil...
Side 148 - WHITENESS, it by that sound signifies the same quality wheresoever to be imagined or met with; and thus universals, whether ideas or terms, are made.
Side 14 - This argument, drawn from universal consent, has this misfortune in it, that if it were true in matter of fact, that there were certain truths, wherein all mankind agreed, it would not prove them innate, if there can be any other way shown, how men may come to that universal agreement, in the things they do consent in; which I presume may be done. 4. What is, is; and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be, not universally assented to.
Side 2 - I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what motions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any or all of them, depend on matter or not.
Side 3 - If by this inquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can discover the powers thereof; how far they reach, to what things they are in any degree proportionate, and where they fail us; I suppose it may be of use to prevail with the busy mind of man to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehension; to stop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and sit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities.
Side 94 - I suspect, a confused notion taken up to serve an hypothesis; and none of those clear truths that either their own evidence forces us to admit, or common experience makes it impudence to deny.
Side 13 - I shall set down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion as an excuse for my mistake, if I be in one ; which I leave to be considered by those who, with me, dispose themselves to embrace truth wherever they find it.