in general, another to that of sound, another to the ways and means of retarding or accelerating the ordinary processes of nature, three others to plant-management, two to miscellaneous topics, heat, weight, growth and fruition, want of rain in Egypt, sources of fevers, one to what would be at the present moment called phenomena of "telepathy." "Experiments" are distinguished by Bacon as "experiments solitary" and "experiments in consort." (Much the greater part of the "facts" of the "Sylva Sylvarum" were, according to one of Bacon's editors, drawn from a few then well-known authors, George Sandys, Cardanus, Aristotle, Pliny, and, especially, the Italian Baptista Porta: some were gathered from hearsay, and some, finally, were the fruit of Bacon's own observation. The collection possesses little or no scientific value in itself.)

"Principles and Origins."1- We may pass over entirely the remaining parts of Bacon's vast scheme, unless, indeed, what we are about to discuss belongs to the Fifth Part, and take up Bacon's metaphysical principles proper. Reality, according to Bacon, is not unknowable; scepticism. is an idle doctrine." Reality is not, indeed, an object of sense, but it is known through combined sense and understanding. The real-that to which the "new method" must guide us is a primary matter, not formless, but having certain definite qualities. Beyond, or behind, this, we cannot by mere philosophy get. It is the First Cause within nature, and the cause of causes next to God Himself, and must be taken just as found. It were as foolish to try to get back of this as not to look for a cause of the immediate phenomena of sense. It is the primary qualities of this matter which are the ultimate objects of philosophy's quest,

the "forms." Philosophy is natural science. Ultimate reality, or God, is known only through Revelation.

Bacon's Position and Rank as a Philosopher. - Bacon deserves, in a certain sense, but not without qualification, the title often accorded to him of the "Father of Modern

1 See Nichol's Bacon.

Inductive Philosophy." The method of induction had, as we have had occasion to see, been advocated in modern philosophy prior to Bacon: but Bacon was the first to make the method the object of comprehensive reflection, and to institute a formal investigation into its character; and, though his "analysis" of the method was imperfect, those who helped practically to perfect the method - Descartes and Newton, in particular were not uninfluenced by what Bacon had done before them. Practically, it is true, Bacon was no inductive philosopher, but he clearly saw and stated the object of inductive philosophy, viz., to discover "causes or facts of causation," and the importance of an "acquaintance with facts," and of complete analysis and cautious. generalization. What he did not appreciate, was the value of certain things which more mature reflection upon induction has learned to emphasize, viz., hypothesis, deductive inference, and verification. Bacon does not touch the metaphysical problems lying back of induction, i. e., does not consider how it is possible, and what it means. But Bacon was something more than a philosopher of induction; he was an initiator of a critical attitude of thought, a real forerunner even, notwithstanding their wide differences, of the greatest of all critical philosophers, Kant; his doctrine. of the idola of human thought is an anticipation (in the empirical sphere of reflection, it is true) of the "Kritik of Pure Reason" of Kant. That Bacon was not a speculative philosopher in the highest sense of the term scarcely needs. be said. Though he condemned mere empiricism in method, the real was practically for him, as a philosopher, in the domain of mere consciousness as distinguished from selfconsciousness, or from the union of the two. He is to be regarded as the initiator of the empirical direction in modern philosophy.

§ 45..

Thomas Hobbes1 (1588-1679).- Hobbes, who sprang 1 Prof. Robertson's "Hobbes' ("Blackwood's Philosophical Classics"); Hobbes's "Elements of Philosophy," "Leviathan," etc.

"

(He resided with the He carried on classical (published 1628) of the "purpose of showing the

from a "plain English stock," was educated at the University of Oxford. He left the university with a very unfavorable opinion of the instruction and discipline in vogue there. Among the causes of his dissatisfaction had been the Scholastic, superficially formal treatment of logical, metaphysical, and physical sciences at Oxford. After graduation Hobbes travelled on the Continent, in the capacity of tutor to a member of the Cavendish family. family for more than thirty years.) studies; and made a translation History of Thucydides for the evils of popular government." Between the years 1621 and 1626 he was, it appears, private secretary of Bacon, and assisted in the translation of some of Bacon's works from English into Latin. In the years 1629-1631 a second journey was made by him on the Continent, and within not many years afterwards two others, all of which proved of the utmost importance for Hobbes's scientific development, since they brought him into direct communication with some of the most eminent men of science on the Continent, and acquainted him with the actual state of scientific discovery at the time. During the period of the Civil Wars and for some time before and afterwards (i. e., from 1640 to 1651), Hobbes was again on the Continent; after that he lived in England continually till his death. His scientific and philosophical activity were for the most part completed before his final return to England from the Continent. Literary composition and acrid learned controversies occupied his later years.

Works. Hobbes's chief philosophical works are, "Elementa Philosophica de Cive" (1642), "De Corpore Politico, or the Elements of Law, Moral, and Politic" (1650), "Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Polity' (1650), "Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical and Civil" (1651), "Of Liberty and Necessity," etc. (1654), "Elementa Philosophia" ("De Corpore," "De Homine," "De Cive,"

1668). (We may mention, of Hobbes's nonphilosophical works, his "Behemoth," a history of the Civil War, and a metrical translation of the "Iliad" and the "Odyssey.")

Philosophy. Problem, Parts, and End of Philosophy. Philosophy is, according to Hobbes, the knowledge of causes; or, more accurately speaking, the knowledge of causes from given effects, and the knowledge of effects from already known causes: it is the knowledge of the generative and the generable; the knowledge of "nature." Philosophy is a science in the strict sense: it is, indeed, science itself (Tτýμn). It has nothing to do with the supernatural (or nongenerable) or the eternal (the object of "faith"); it is not in any sense metaphysics or theology. It is distinct from experience as such, or the merely empirical knowledge of things (Aristotle's prepía); it is distinguished from experience in that it is reasoned systematic knowledge, whereas experience is haphazard and reaches no universal conclusions. It has nothing to do with history, natural or civil, so far as these rest on experience (including authority or testimony). Philosophy, or science, as general knowledge, is a knowledge of names expressing the common attributes of things; its foundation is definitions (or the explications of the meanings of names), or when (as in the case of the simplest notions, space, body, motion, etc.) definitions are impossible, the nearest possible approach to them by mere indication or suggestion. The body of all primary or fundamental definitions, together with their direct consequences, constitutes First Philosophy (philosophia prima). All definitions or indications or suggestions of primary notions are expressions of abstract notions of things perceived by sense; all knowledge takes its rise in sense. But sense perceives only bodies and their attributes. This it can do only as motions proceeding from bodies affect the organs of sense. Bodies are in motion; their attributes, so far as they can be known at least, are generated by motion. By motion in bodies is generated the attribute of extension, the science.

of which is Geometry. The theory of effects of motion between bodies is the Doctrine of Motion. The theory of motion as it affects the senses, producing the qualities of light, heat, sound, etc., is Physics. The doctrine of motions of the individual mind is Moral Philosophy; that of motions of minds associated is Civil Philosophy. If we add to the foregoing divisions Logic, or the science of reasoning, or computation (in the arithmetical sense), we have the main branches of Philosophy as the doctrine of bodies. These branches group themselves as follows: (1) Preliminary Sciences, Logic and First Philosophy; (2) Natural Philosophy, — Geometry, the Doctrine of Motion, Physics; (3) Civil Philosophy, -Moral Philosophy and Civil Philosophy (in the narrower sense). "The end or scope of philosophy is," says Hobbes, "that we may make use to our benefit of effects formerly seen; or that by the application of bodies to one another we may produce the like effects of those we conceive in our mind, as far forth as matter, strength, and industry will permit, for the commodity of human life."

First Philosophy. It is possible to conceive all things annihilated, except space and time. From the notions of space and time are derived all such notions as part and whole, division and composition, one and number, continuous and contiguous, beginning and end, finite and infinite. Space and time are the subjective correlatives of two primary attributes of body, viz., extension and motion. The "attributes" extension and motion- and indeed attributes in general — do not form a part of, or even inhere in, body as such, but are merely our modes of conceiving body, or the "power body has of making itself to be conceived." The only necessary attribute of body is extension. The generation and the destruction of body are merely the generation and the destruction of the attributes of body (extension excepted). For us body is its attributes; and the essence of body is merely "that accident for which a thing gets its name." Body as