An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Bind 2J. Johnson, 1805 - 510 sider |
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Side 31
... in nature ; which , perhaps , is none of the least causes , that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes , even in opinions purely + purely philosophical , and where they have no other Ch . 10 . 31 Abuse of Words .
... in nature ; which , perhaps , is none of the least causes , that men are so hardly drawn to quit their mistakes , even in opinions purely + purely philosophical , and where they have no other Ch . 10 . 31 Abuse of Words .
Side 37
... opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with , yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do , in their arguings one with an- other , is , that they speak different ...
... opinions in the volumes and variety of controversies the world is distracted with , yet the most I can find that the contending learned men of different parties do , in their arguings one with an- other , is , that they speak different ...
Side 87
... opinions of those who differ from them , may consider whether sometimes they are not more due to their own ; and that they may be persuaded a little to temper that heat , which , supposing the truth in their current opinions , gives ...
... opinions of those who differ from them , may consider whether sometimes they are not more due to their own ; and that they may be persuaded a little to temper that heat , which , supposing the truth in their current opinions , gives ...
Side 93
... opinions in this matter . But possibly there be those , who will think your lordship's authority of more use to them in the case , than those justly decried names ; and be glad to find your lordship a patron of the oracles of reason ...
... opinions in this matter . But possibly there be those , who will think your lordship's authority of more use to them in the case , than those justly decried names ; and be glad to find your lordship a patron of the oracles of reason ...
Side 98
... opinion is plain from these words , Ergo animus ( qui , ut ego dico , divinus ) est , ut Euripides audet dicere , Deus : & qui- dem , si Deus aut anima aut ignis est , idem est animus hominis . Nam ut illa natura cœlestis et terrâ vacat ...
... opinion is plain from these words , Ergo animus ( qui , ut ego dico , divinus ) est , ut Euripides audet dicere , Deus : & qui- dem , si Deus aut anima aut ignis est , idem est animus hominis . Nam ut illa natura cœlestis et terrâ vacat ...
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Almindelige termer og sætninger
abstract ideas affirmed agree agreement or disagreement annexed arguments assent bability bishop of Worcester body called capable cerning certainty changeling chimeras clear colour complex idea conceive concerning connexion consider demonstration discourse disputes distinct ideas dity doubt earth equal errour eternal evidence examine existence faculties faith falshood farther gism give gold hath ideas they stand ignorance imperfection inquiry intermediate ideas intuitive knowledge language learned ledge less lordship matter maxims men's ment mind mixed modes moral motion names of substances natural philosophy nature never nexion observe opinions particular perceive perception principles probability produce proofs propositions qualities rational real essence reason received religion revelation rience Secondly sense signification simple ideas soever sort soul sounds species stances suppose syllogism tain things thought tion triangle true truth understanding universal propositions unquestionable truths whereby wherein whereof words
Populære passager
Side 273 - Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father of light, and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to mankind that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of their natural faculties: revelation is natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God immediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testimony and proofs it gives, that they come from God.
Side 339 - I have mentioned mathematics as a way to settle in the mind a habit of reasoning closely and in train; not that I think it necessary that all men should be deep mathematicians, but that having got the way of reasoning, which that study necessarily brings the mind to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge as they shall have occasion.30 For in all sorts of reasoning every single argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration; the connection and dependence of ideas...
Side 163 - For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle, (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult,) for it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once.
Side 103 - We have the ideas of matter and thinking, but possibly shall never be able to know whether any mere material being thinks or no; it being impossible for us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover whether Omnipotency has not given to some systems of matter, fitly disposed, a power to perceive and think...
Side 356 - Reading furnishes the mind only with materials of knowledge ; it is thinking makes what we read ours. We are of the ruminating kind, and it is not enough to cram ourselves with a great load of collections ; unless we chew thorn over again, they will not give us strength and nourishment.
Side 102 - Who also hath made us able ministers of the new testament ; not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.
Side 41 - But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats...
Side 112 - ... the sciences capable of demonstration; wherein I doubt not but from self-evident propositions, by necessary consequences as incontestable as those in mathematics, the measures of right and wrong might be made out to any one that will apply himself with the same indifferency and attention to the one as he does to the other of these sciences.
Side 201 - ... deserves the name of knowledge. If we persuade ourselves that our faculties act and inform us right concerning the existence of those objects that affect them, it cannot pass for an ill-grounded confidence: for I think nobody can, in earnest, be so sceptical as to be uncertain of the existence of those things which he sees and feels.
Side 438 - Heat is a very brisk agitation of the insensible parts of the object, which produces in us that sensation, from whence we denominate the object hot ; so what in our sensation is heat, in the object is nothing b,ut motion.